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Introduction
Scholars have developed three prominent schools of thought on the
Arab Spring, which emerged in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya,
Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, and other countries. One school
describes the Arab Spring as a "pristine" popular movement akin to the
Civil Rights Movement in the United States, the anti-apartheid movement
in South Africa, the fall of the Berlin Wall and communism in Eastern
Europe and the Caucasus, the Tiananmen Square protests, the Democratic
t Thanks are due to Andrew Orr, Editor-in-Chief 2011-2012, Cornell
International Law Journal, for organizing this conference, and to my research assistant
Dan Sarfati, J.D, Florida International University College of Law, 2010. Thanks also to
ProfessorJordan Paust for sharing early drafts of his Article for this symposium with me.
46 CORNELL INf'L LJ. 75 (2013)
Cornell International Law Journal
Russia Movement, or the Iranian Green Movement.' A second argues that
it is a change directed and dictated by the great powers, especially the
United States acting through the White House, the State Department, the
Pentagon, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the International
Republican Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Two
strands of this second theory exist: the first, popular among critics of the
Arab Spring and of U.S. involvement, maintains that the United States has
unwittingly allied itself with the Muslim Brotherhood and helped to topple
relatively moderate and secular regimes with likely disastrous results;2 and
the second, popular among supporters of President Barack Obama and
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, characterizes U.S. policy as actively pro-
moting democracy and freedom against dictators, torturers, and other
forces holding back the prosperity and progress in the majority of Arab
countries.3 A third theory could be summarized with the phrase "Here
Comes Everybody." Under this theory, social media, the rise of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and pan-Arab satellite television such as Al-Jazeera have
empowered populations and made simultaneous revolutions possible in
disparate contexts and at a rapid pace.4
This Article analyzes several key international legal instruments
related to the Arab Spring, and attempts to bring greater local specificity to
sweeping generalizations about the Arab Spring and its causes and conse-
quences. Three findings emerge from this analysis. First, the role of the
United States cannot be discounted, as various U.S. leaders have chosen
divergent responses to crimes against humanity, such as torture and politi-
cal persecution, in Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Saudi
1. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Hoping for Arab Mandelas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/opinion/27friedman.html; Juan C.
Zarate, Al Qaeda Stirs Again, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/04/18/opinion/18Zarate.html.
2. See, e.g., Martin Gould & Ashley Martella, Walid Phares: Obama, NATO Must Stop
Libya's Hard-Line Islamists from Taking Power, NEwsMAx (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.
newsmax.com/Headline/WalidPhares-Libya-Gadhafi/2011/08/22/id/408231. There
are echoes of this strand in the position of the Russian Federation on Libya and Syria, a
position that criticized states in the Security Council, such as the United States, Britain,
and France, which refused to pressure the armed rebels of Libya and Syria to give up
their plans of using violent means to bring about a "humanitarian catastrophe," followed
by external interference in potential violation of the U.N. Charter. Thomas Grove, Rus-
sia Criticises Libya Contact Group (Update 3), REUTERS (May 6, 2011), http://uk.reuters.
com/article/2011/05/06/libya-russia-idUKLDE745OIE20110506; Russia Accuses West of
"Immoral" Stance on Syria, BBC NEws (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-16158584.
3. See, e.g., EJ. Dionne, Obama's New Focus on Democracy, Human Rights, REAL.
CLEAR POL. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/12/12/
obama abroad democratic realism 1 12359.html.
4. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public
Sphere, and Political Change, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 28-30, 32-33, 39-40.
This Time Is Different is the sardonic title of a book chronicling centuries of similar
patterns in financial and fiscal crises. See generally CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S.
ROGOFF, Ttus TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES oF FINANcIAl FOLLY (2009).
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Arabia, and Bahrain, to name a few.5 History has shown that, depending
on U.S. economic and security interests with respect to a country and its
military, crimes may be excused and tyrants granted a new lease on life
despite overseeing a failed state and a resentful populace. This reprieve is
most obvious in the case of Sudan, where the United States has not called
for regime change despite far worse crimes against civilians, significantly
harsher tyranny and social malaise, and greatly inferior economic and
human development statistics than in Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia, where the
United States has made such calls. Second, the Muslim Brotherhood and
Al-Qaeda veterans have certainly played a unique role in the Arab Spring,
as compared with prior social movements, but their interventions have
been mediated by U.S. policy, social media, and Al-Jazeera and other satel-
lite television networks. Focusing unduly on technology or foreign states
and neglecting local political and religious movements detracts attention
from the interdependence of these social and technological forces on one
another. Third, the lessons of Iraq since 2003 and the Gaza Strip since
2005 should not be ignored in wargaming (or predicting the results of)
what may be called the "Twitterlutions." 6 Reprisals against politicians and
security forces that perpetrated or tolerated mass violence against civilians,
chaos, religious extremism, and economic disaster may be inevitable after
the abrupt collapse of regimes such as those in Libya or Yemen, just as
these trends emerged in Iraq. These lessons suggest explanations for
Washington's strong support for the central role of the military in Egypt,
while also possibly foretelling a humanitarian disaster during and after a
chaotic regime change in other countries. Armed with the lessons of his-
tory, the United Nations and its members should be prepared to act more
swiftly, and wisely, than they did after regime changes in Iraq and else-
where. I argue that existing international treaties, most notably those relat-
ing to genocide, war crimes, the political independence of states, refugee
flows, and human rights, provide an adequate legal structure, despite some
gaps, for responding to the Arab Spring's dangers.
1. The Cause of Peace
President Obama came into office promising to "promote the cause of
peace," and "reclaim the American dream."7 At his famous Cairo speech in
June of 2009, he promised to end policies that "empower those who sow
hatred rather than peace, and [which] promote conflict rather than the co-
5. This Article must omit any analysis or description of events in Syria due to the
editors' length limitations.
6. The BBC may have coined this term for use in reference to Middle Eastern oppo-
sition movements organized via social media in 2009, in the context of the Iranian post-
election protests of 2009. Paul Mason, The Iranian Twitter-lution?, BBC NEws Uune 15,
2009, 12:08 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2009/06/the_
iraniantwitterlution.html.
7. Transcript: 'This is Your Victory,' Says Obama, CNN.com (Nov. 4, 2008), http://
edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/1 1/04/obama.transcript/.
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operation that can help all of our people achieve justice and prosperity."8
However, by 2009 several historical forces had been set in motion that
President Obama could only accelerate, contain, or divert - not control or
terminate. The late Cold War saw several major powers back jihadist
groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood as a way of breaking up the
Soviet bloc, and especially its allies in the Greater Middle East such as
Afghanistan, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Syria. Prior
to 1984, the Muslim Brotherhood of Afghanistan generated the leaders of
the Afghan mujahideen against the Afghan king, then the Afghan secular
government, and then the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.9 Saudi Arabia
financed the jihadists, including the Brotherhood, with $3 billion, in addi-
tion to $5 billion from the United States and $2 billion from other
sources. 10 Tens of thousands of Saudis and other nationals of Arab states
had contact with the "holy war" in Afghanistan, which gave way to an
"Islamic Revolution" in 1992 and an even more radical form of revolution
with the rise of the Taliban between 1994 and 2000.11 The CIA knew
before 9/11 that Saudi charities financed Al-Qaeda. 12 By the time Presi-
dent Obama took office, Al-Qaeda enjoyed a sanctuary in Pakistan's Feder-
ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP), and surrounding towns; Osama bin Laden himself was living
near Pakistan's capital, Islamabad.13 This occurred in the aftermath of
Pakistan's granting tribal areas the right to vote and holding elections in
FATA and NWFP between 1997 and 2003.14 The Taliban gained control of
the FATA between 2004 and 2009, and eradicated the traditional system of
autonomous tribal governance.1 5 The Gulf Arab countries provided signif-
icant funding for weapons imports into the NWFP and Baluchistan for the
Taliban.1 6
8. Full Text: Barack Obama's Cairo Speech, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2009), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/04/barack-obama-keynote-speech-egypt/print.
9. See HANNIBAL TRAvIs, GENOCIDE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, IRAQ,
AND SUDAN 380-81 (2010); S. Amjad Hussein, Tranquillity and Turmoil: Afghans Don't
Give Up, TOLEDO BLADE, Dec. 23, 1984, at B5.
10. See TRAvis, supra note 9, at 385.
11. See id. at 487-94.
12. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON
TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 35 (2004), available at http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staffstatements/911_TerrFinMonograph.pdf ("The CIA
obtained a very general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money. It knew relatively
early on, for example, about the loose affiliation of financial institutions, businesses,
and wealthy individuals who supported extremist Islamic activities. It also understood
that ... Saudi-based charities played a role in funding al Qaeda and moving terrorist-
related money.").
13. Bruce Hoffman, A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama Administration, 21
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 359, 359 (2009).
14. See id. at 367.
15. See id. at 366.
16. See TRAvIs, supra note 9, at 504; Eric Schmitt, Many Sources Feed Taliban's War
Chest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/
19taliban.html ("The C.I.A. recently estimated in a classified report that Taliban leaders
and their associates had received $106 million in the past year from donors outside
Afghanistan, a figure first reported last month by The Washington Post. Private citizens
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Conditions were little better in the Middle East itself when President
Obama took office. During the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood of Pales-
tine emerged as a rival to the PLO, with the Brotherhood funded and
trained by Israel, some argue, as a counterweight to the more secular
PLO.17 By the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait funded the Brother-
hood's successor, Hamas, to the tune of more than $30 million, with Iran
also providing some financing.18 In a 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, a leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the current head of Al-Qaeda, Ayman
al-Zawahiri argued that the endgame would be to create "a Muslim state ...
in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world . . .. The
center would be in the Levant [including Palestine and Syria] and Egypt."' 9
That year, President Bush encouraged Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
to withdraw from Gaza in pursuit of an Israeli-Palestinian peace in Bush's
second term.20 In January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative
Council elections and claimed full control of all of Palestine. This led to a
bloody power struggle with the PLO in 2007, in which Hamas won Gaza,
and the PLO retained the West Bank.21 The dwindling Christian popula-
tions of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are expected to completely disap-
pear by 2022.22
In Iraq, after the fall of the Ba'ath party in May 2003,23 an inadequate
military-to-population ratio existed to protect the civilian population.24
from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and some Persian Gulf nations are the largest individ-
ual contributors, an American counterterrorism official said." (emphasis added)).
17. See SEAN F. MCMAHON, THE DISCOURSE OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELi RELATIONS: PERSIS-
TENT ANALYTICS AND PRACTICES 135 (2009); QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, ISLAMIC AcTIVIsM: A
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH 137 n.12 (2004); see also Anat Saragosti, Hamas
Rally Our Fault, YNETNEWS.COM (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/
0,7340,L-3638973,00.html.
18. See SARA Roy, HAMAS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GAZA: ENGAGING THE ISLAMIST SOCIAL
SECTOR 30 (2011).
19. William McCants, Al Qaeda's Challenge: The Jihadists' War with Islamist Demo-
crats, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2011, at 27.
20. Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Supports Plan by Sharon for a Withdrawal From Gaza,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/12/international/mid-
dleeast/12prexy.html?ref=arielsharon.
21. Gaza E.R.: Fatah vs. Hamas, PBS.ORG (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/
wnet/wideangle/episodes/gaza-er/fatah-vs-hamas/1227/; Steve Inskeep & Eric Wes-
tervelt, Hamas Gaining Control of Gaza, NPR (June 14, 2007), http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/story.php?storyld=11043066; Dana Weiss & Ronen Shamir, Corporate
Accountability to Human Rights: The Case of the Gaza Strip, 24 HARv. Hum. RTs. J. 155,
163 (2011) ("In 2007, following a constitutional impasse that resulted from said elec-
tions, Hamas forcefully took over the administrative and the security apparatuses of the
Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip.").
22. See Etgar Lefkovits, Expert: 'Christian groups in PA to disappear', JERUSALEM POST
(Dec. 4, 2007), http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast//Article.aspx?id=84181 ("Christian
communities living in Palestinian-run territories in the West Bank and Gaza are likely to
dissipate completely within the next 15 years.").
23. See LEONARD J. LAw, RULE OF LAW IN IRAQ: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE UNDER OCCUPA-
TION 11, 15-16 (2004), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA429242.
24. See Au A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE AR, LOSING THE
PEACE 155-60 (2007); Canadian Broad. Corp., Former US Administrator Blasts US Post-
war Actions in Iraq, CBCNEws (Nov. 26, 2003), http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2003/
11/26/jaygarner031126.html; Georg Mascolo, Interview with Bob Woodward: "A System-
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Tens of thousands of teachers and factory workers lost their jobs, while
some judges who had been responsible for implementing laws that grossly
violated international human rights stayed on.2 5 Lists of Ba'athists began
circulating in Baghdad, and death squads killed thousands of former offi-
cials, including teachers, professors, and doctors. 26
The policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority and President Bush
to empower religious parties in Iraq from the very start of the occupation
brought the number of large Middle Eastern theocracies to three.27 They
created an Iraqi Governing Council stuffed with religious extremists,
which issued a transitional constitution that established an official religion
and banned secular laws that contradicted important religious laws.28 The
Iraqi Constitution, which passed by a nationwide referendum in 2005,
stated that the Islamic religion would henceforth be a "fundamental source
of legislation."29
atic State of Denial", DER SPIEGEL (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
spiegel/0, 1518,441841,00.html; John McChesney, Millionaire-Turned-Filmmaker Traces
Iraq War, NPR (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=13903569.
25. See LAW, supra note 23, at 15, 21-36; Ann Scott Tyson, Iraqi justice System Starts
to Mend, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/
0801/p06sOl-woiq.html; James Hider, Saddam's Judge Is Accused of Being Leading
Baathist, TIMES (London), Jan. 23, 2006, at 30.
26. See ALLAW1, supra note 24, at 135-46; GILBERT BURNHAM ET AL., THE HUMAN COST
OF THE WAR IN IRAQ: A MORTALITY STUDY, 2002-2006 (2006), http://web.mit.edu/cis/
pdf/Human Cost of War.pdf; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, IRAQ: COUNTRY PROFILE
2007 23, 25, 40 (2007), http://www.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issueid=62523191&
mode=pdf; IMAD HARB, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF IRAQ 1, 5 (2008), http://
www.usip.org/files/resources/srl95.pdf.
27. See In Defense of Human Dignity: The International Religious Freedom Report:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights and Int'l Operations of the
H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 143 (2005) (statement of Nina Shea, Director,
Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom House) (noting that the Iraqi constitution is the
only constitution other than those of Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in which the
Supreme Court directly reviews laws for compliance with religious "provisions"); Hayat
Alvi, The Human Rights of Women and Social Transformation in the Arab Middle East, 9
MIDDLE E. REV. INT'L AFF. 142, 143 (2005), http://www.gloria-center.org/meria/2005/
06/Alvi%20Hayat%20pdf.pdf; Peter W. Galbraith, Iraq: Bush's Islamic Republic, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (July 14, 2005), www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/aug/11/iraq-
bushs-islamic-republic/?pagination=false.
28. See LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
[CONSTITUTION] Mar. 8, 2004, art. 7, 26(A), available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/
iz00000_.html; YIFAT SUSSKIND, PROMISING DEMOCRACY, IMPOSING THEOCRACY: GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE AND THE US WAR ON IRAQ 3 (2007), available at http://issuu.com/
madre/docs/iraqreport?mode=embed&documentd=081008022806-8a52fl 1650474c9a
bcda04a5c62eb2Oe&layout-white; Hannibal Travis, After Regime Change: United States
Law and Policy Regarding Iraqi Refugees, 2003-2008, 55 WAYNE L. REv. 1007, 1054
(2009).
29. See Articles 2, 90-91, DOUSTOURJOUMHOURIAT AL-IRAQ [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ] of 2005; ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION:
THE POLITICS OP IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 236-37 (2009) (summarizing these provi-
sions and their dangers for Iraq's then-existing secular laws); Michael J. Frank, U.S. Mili-
tary Courts and the War in Iraq, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 645, 730 (2006) ("Regardless
of whether Sunnis or Shiites are responsible for this judicial activism, arguably the Iraqi
positive law supports [some] religious discrimination in favor of Islamic insurgents.").
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Another development with significant momentum when Obama took
office was the U.S. "democracy-promotion" policy and its flotilla of related
institutions and offices. The great powers, especially the United States,
have accelerated regime change in undemocratic societies. The White
House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the International Republican Institute, and the
National Endowment for Democracy have stood out as architects of such
regime change, although legions of other actors and agencies no doubt
played their part. 30 Official press releases and dominant mass media nar-
ratives describe U.S. policy as actively promoting democracy and freedom
against dictators, torturers, and other retrograde actors in the Middle East
and Africa. 3 '
The period between 2004 and 2010 was something of a pause or even
a rollback for the cause of democracy. United States democracy-promotion
efforts stalled in China, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as governments prohibited the
activities and arrested the leaders of NGOs and even killed activists linked
to U.S. democracy-assistance spending.32 The Orange Revolution in
30. The process began, perhaps, with Armenia and the Baltics in 1988, and in
Poland with the Solidarity movement, moving to East Germany with protests that
brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification with West Germany, lead-
ing to democratic transitions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, the fall of
Milogevit in Yugoslavia in 2000, and the "color revolutions" against post-Soviet autoc-
racy in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan after that. See LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, UNCER-
TAIN DEMOCRACY: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND GEORGIA'S ROSE REVOLUTION 117 (2009);
Brian Grodsky, Lessons (Not) Learned: A New Look at Bureaucratic Politics and U.S. For-
eign Policy-Making in the Post-Soviet Space, 56 PROBS. POST-COMMUNIsM 43, 43 (2009);
Alexander J. Motyl, Identity Crisis in the Soviet West, BULL. AToMIC SCIENTISTS 21, 22
(Mar. 1989); Gerald Sussman & Sascha Krader, Template Revolutions: Marketing U.S.
Regime Change in Eastern Europe, 5 WESTMINSTER PAPERS COMM. & CULTURE 91, 93,
95-96 (2008). One NGO that is often mentioned as working to common purposes with
the U.S. government is the Open Society Institute, especially regarding Serbia and Yugo-
slavia in 2000, and Poland and Bulgaria before that. See id. at 95-96, 98. Germany's
political party-based "democracy assistance" foundations also spend hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars annually. See NED, infra note 31, at 10.
31. See, e.g., NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, THE BACKLASH AGAINST DEMOCRACY
ASSISTANCE: A REPORT PREPARED BY THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY FOR SENA-
TOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SEN-
ATE 8 (2006) [hereinafter NED], available at http://www.ned.org/docs/backlash06.pdf;
Overview of America's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, THE WHITE HOUSE:
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Sept. 5, 2006), http://web.archive.org/web/200901121330
41/http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/section.html; President George W.
Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/tem
plates/story/story.php?storyld=4460172 ("[1]t is the policy of the United States to seek
and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and
culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.").
32. See NED, supra note 31, at 15-38; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY
INDEx 2010: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 6, 14, 26-27 (2010), http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/
DemocracyIndex_2010_web.pdf. The NED includes Venezuela with Russia as a severe
violator of democratic norms, but fails to note that Venezuela allowed a number of other
candidates to face Hugo Chavez in the 1997 and 2005 elections. Compare id. at 39-40,
with MARINA OTTAWAY, DEMOCRACY CHALLENGED: THE RISE OF SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM
88-89 (2003) and ELIZABETH GACKSTETTER NICHOLS & KIMBERLYJ. MORSE, VENEZUELA 105
(2010).
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Ukraine fizzled out in 2010 amid charges of massive corruption.33 In
Kyrgyzstan, post-election violence erupted into enormous massacres in
2010, especially of ethnic Uzbeks.3 4
Africa was a particularly disappointing site of confrontation between
democrats and autocrats, as illustrated by Table 1, which is a partial list.
Table 1 - The State of Democracy in the Thirty-Five Largest African
Nations (by Area) in 200935
Years Before 2009 in
Which Last Change
of Leadership
Countries Undemocratic Countries Occurred in Country
Gabon, Libya Gabon, Libya 38+
Angola, Equatorial Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, Republic of the Guinea, Republic of the 28+
Congo Congo
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, 18+Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Sudan, Tunisia,
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe
Algeria, Chad, Cote Algeria, Chad, Cote
d'Ivoire, Democratic d'Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, 8+
Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda,
Senegal, Western Sahara Western Sahara
Botswana, Central African
Republic, Kenya, Namibia, Central African Republic,GhnMadagascar, Mali,08Ghana, dgsaal adagascar, Mauritania,08
Mauritania, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Somalia, South
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia
The primary exception to the 2004-2010 trend was Latin America,
where new social movements and continuing economic misery ensured
democratic transitions in Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.36 Still, a poll con-
33. See, e.g., Christian Caryl, Yanukovych Won. Get Over It., FOREIGN POL. (Feb. 8,
2010), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/08/yanukovich
won-get over it.
34. See Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Uzbekistan Weekly Roundup, EURASIANET.ORG (July
24, 2010), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61596; Kyrgyzstan: Azimbek Beknazarov
Reports Over 800 People Massacred in Osh and Jalal-Abad, FERGHANA (July 12, 2010),
http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=1762&mode=snews.
35. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2008 (2008), available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2008; EcoNOMIsT INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, supra note 32. The Economist's classification of "Authoritarian" countries was
used to generate undemocratic classification.
36. See Commentary: A Good Precedent Set by Convicting Peru's Fujimori, MIAMI HER-
ALD (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/04/15/66201/commentary-a-
good-precedent-set.html; Man of the People Closes in on Presidency, SCOTSMAN (Oct. 14,
2006), http://www.scotsman.com/news/international/man ofthepeople-closes-in_
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ducted in 2005 found that half of all Americans did not necessarily sup-
port using their tax dollars to promote democracy abroad.37 Though the
situation was grim, something was coming that promised to help break the
logjam.
A third development confronting the incoming president was the rise
of search engines, social media, and broadband Internet access. Internet
usage more than doubled in Egypt, for example, from 2005-2010, with
30% of the population having access in 2010.38 Broadband connections
increased at an even more rapid pace, but from a very low base, so access
was still rare.39 By April of 2011, Egypt had more than seven million
Facebook users, along with hundreds of thousands of Twitter users. In the
first quarter of 2011, Twitter hash tags such as #egypt, #jan25, #libya,
#bahrain, and #protest garnered hundreds of thousands or millions of
mentions.40 Even Libya, where the government heavily restricted the
Internet and social media, had tens of thousands of Twitter users by
then.41 Although not often classed with other "social media" projects, as of
2008 Google and Yahoo! operated in a way that leveraged the social net-
work of humanity, by transmuting into a link structure the World Wide
Web pages that individuals and institutions posted, allowing Internet users
to rapidly find what their fellow humans thought was "worth looking at."42
Social media enabled activists to follow breaking events (especially
Twitter), create groups of like-minded persons (especially Facebook),
organize mass protests and other revolutionary actions (especially
Facebook), and broadcast mass demands for change along with images and
videos of regime repression around the world (especially Google and You-
Tube).43 Twitter arguably emerged out of innovations by peace and eco-
on .presidency-1-721165; Revolution! Please Give Generously, ECONOMIST (Apr. 23,
2009), http://www.economist.com/node/13527399?story_jd=13527399; Victory for the
Andean Chameleon, ECONOMIST (June 9, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/
18805443; Donna Lee Van Cott, Radical Democracy in the Andes: Indigenous Parties and
the Quality of Democracy in Latin America 1 (Kellogg Inst., Working Paper No. 333,
2006), available at kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/333.pdf.
37. See NED, supra note 31, at 9.
38. See Anne Miroux, Dir., Div. on Tech. & Logistics, UNCTAD, Opening Address at
the Launch of the ICT Policy Review of Egypt: UNCTAD ICT Policy Review of Egypt
(Oct. 26, 2011).
39. See id.
40. Racha Mourtada & Fadi Salem, Civil Movements: The Impact of Facebook and
Twitter 1 ARAB SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT 15, 16 (2011), available at http://www.dsg.ae/en/
publication/Pdf_.En/DSG ArabSocialMediaReportNo_2.pdf.
41. See id. at 29.
42. SERGEY BRIN & LAWRENCE PAGE, THE ANATOMY OF A LARGE-SCALE HYPERTEXTUAL
WEB SEARCH ENGINE § 2.1.2 (1998), available at http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/361/1/
1998-8.pdf (introducing Google at the Seventh International World-Wide Web Confer-
ence in Brisbane, Australia).
43. Jared Cohen, Posting to Twitter (Jan. 27, 2011, 11:36 AM), http://twitter.com/
JaredCohen/statuses/30665407077556224 ("One Egyptian says, 'facebook used to set
the date, twitter used to share logistics, youtube to show the world, all to connect peo-
ple."'); Paul Seaman, Egypt's Protests Owe Little to Social Media, 21sT CENTURY PR ISSUES:
PAUL SEAMAN (Jan. 31, 2011), http://paulseaman.eu/2011/01/egypts-protests-owe-little-
to-social-media/.
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nomic-reform activists protesting the national political conventions in the
United States in 2004 and was intended to create a platform for text-mes-
saging across crowds of protesters, with copies sent to the mass media.44
Tweets, Facebook postings, and YouTube videos spread virally by such
means as shares, favorites, "Likes," and "Retweets," all forms of many-to-
many communication.45 During President Obama's term in office, the
U.S. State Department and various NGOs funded efforts to train Middle-
Eastern activists in the use of blogs and social media for democracy-promo-
tion purposes. 46
Along with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and pan-Arab satellite
television stations such as Al-Jazeera, these new technologies have made
simultaneous revolutions possible in disparate contexts in a manner not
seen since the 1989-1991 period, if ever.47 The Muslim Brotherhood and
Al-Jazeera are powerful political and social phenomena, the former existing
in perhaps seventy countries but working towards a more or less consistent
objective; and the latter built with seed money in the hundreds of millions
of dollars by the Emir of Qatar, and then distributed worldwide by Dish
Network and Rupert Murdoch's Sky Digital, among others.48 The Emir of
Qatar used Al-Jazeera to distract attention from Qatar's security and diplo-
matic links to Israel and the United States. The network has urged "mar-
tyrs" from other Islamic countries to wage war on Israel and the United
States, promoted the financing of Al-Qaeda and Hamas, and disseminated
the rhetoric of these groups.49 These developments converged to make the
Arab Spring more successful than it might have been in the 1980s or
1990s, when Middle Eastern and African peoples also insisted on change,
but torture and massacres muffled their cries with no YouTube and few
44. See Digital Darkness: U.S., U.K. Companies Help Egyptian Regime Shut Down Tele-
communications and Identify Dissident Voices, DEMOCRACY Now! (Feb. 1, 2011), http://
www.democracynow.org/2011/2/l/digitaLdarkness us-uk-companieshelp.
45. See, e.g., Frederic I. Solop, "RT @BarackObama We Just Made History": Twitter
and the 2008 Presidential Election, in COMMUNICATOR-IN-CHIEF: How BARACK OBAMA USED
NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGY TO WIN THE WHITE HOUSE 39 Uohn Allen Hendricks & Robert
E. Denton, Jr. eds., 2010); Interview by Terry Gross, NPR, with Biz Stone, co-founder,
Twitter (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyld=133775340.
46. MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., ANOTHER U.S.
DEFICIT-CHINA AND AMERICA-PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 37, 41-42
(Comm. Print 2011); PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SER-
VICE, U.S. INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE GLOBAL INTERNET FREEDOM: ISSUES, POLICY, AND TECH-
NOLOGY 15 (2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41120_20110103.pdf;
Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, Supporting Dissent with Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/us/24iht-letter.html.
47. See HUGH MILES, AL-JAZEERA: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE ARAB NEWS CHANNEL THAT
Is CHALLENGING THE WEST 28, 36, 42 (2005); Interview by Lawrence R. Velvel with Hugh
Miles, author, AL-JAZEERA THE INSIDE STORY OF THE ARAB NEWS CHANNEL THAT IS CHAL-
LENGING THE WEST, in Bos. Mass., available at http://www.youtube.com/watchv-liPHpL
wFGfO.
48. See MILES, supra note 47, at 28, 36.
49. TAL SAMUEL-AZRAN, AL-JAZEERA AND U.S. WAR COVERAGE 31-34 (2010).
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satellites being used to mobilize global support.50
A fourth development was the ongoing articulation of the Responsibil-
ity to Protect (RTP) civilians from genocide, crimes against humanity, or
war crimes perpetrated by their own governments. The modem version of
the RTP, independent of Security Council authority, and working to avert
genocide or crimes against humanity, emerged in the global South with
India's invasion of East Pakistan to end a genocide in 1971, continuing
with Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia to end a genocide in 1978,
Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979, the Economic Community of West
African States' actions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in northern Iraq in
1991, the U.S. invasion of Somalia in 1993, the French invasion of Rwanda
in 1994, the British invasion of Sierra Leone in 2000, the NATO bombing
of Kosovo and Yugoslavia and backing of Kosovar Albanian rebels in 1999,
the Australian invasion of East Timor in 1999, and the Russian invasion of
Georgia in 2008.51 From 1999 to 2001, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy advocated for change within the United Nations to bring about
intervention against "extreme abuse[s]," with an international commission
on intervention issuing a report in 2001 entitled The Responsibility to Pro-
tect.52 In 2005, the World Summit Outcome Document labeled the RTP an
emerging principle of customary international law.53 The details of the
RTP doctrine are the subject of Part VII.D, infra.
The remarkable speed of changes in some countries during the Arab
Spring stands in palpable contrast to the failed revolutions within majority-
Arab countries from the 1970s through the 1990s. One potential explana-
tion, explored below in a country-specific, chronological fashion, is that
50. Examples of past failed uprisings in the Middle East include the events sur-
rounding the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, the civil war in
Syria in 1984, the violent strife within Iran and Iraq during the 1980s, the revolt in
northern and southern Iraq in 1991, the resistance to Moroccan rule in Western Sahara
since at least the 1980s, the Houthi and socialist rebellions in Yemen in the 1990s, and
the long struggle of Bahrain's and Saudi Arabia's Shi'a Arab populations. Notable excep-
tions include the "Cedar Revolution" of Lebanon in 2006, the Palestinian intifada of the
late 1980s and early 1990s, which resulted in the establishment of an increasingly large
and powerful Palestinian Authority in the mid-to-late 1990s, and the secession of Kurd-
ish regions from northern Iraq with U.N. and NATO backing in the 1990s.
51. See Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilat-
eral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0.
Keohane eds., 2003); JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WINNING THE WAR ON WAR 146, 237 (2011);
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOvEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 49-126 (2001); Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian
Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and
Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 333, 343-65 (1998); Jeremy Levitt, Pre-Inter-
vention Trust-Building, African States and Enforcing the Peace: The Case of ECOWAS in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, 24 LIBER. STUD. J. 1-26 (1999).
52. LLOYD AXWORTHY, NAVIGATING A NEw WORLD. CANADA'S GLOBAL FUTURE 190-92
(2004).
53. ALEx J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 6-7 (2009); U.N. Secretary-General,
In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 9 135, U.N.
Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
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the Internet and Al-Jazeera mobilized international opinion to demand
selective regime change, sometimes by force, in 2011.
II. Wargaming the Arab Spring: General Principles
Economic and military disputes are comparable in their abstract form
to multi-move games between two or more sides. 54 The moves of the game
may be attacks or other allocations of resources.55 An attack may be con-
ducted by various operations, such as offensive infantry, air, or sea opera-
tions, or counter-infantry, counter-air, or counter-sea operations.56
Depending on its parameters, a game may have a solution for a given num-
ber of moves, defined as the "optimal pure strategies" for the sides.5 7 A
player must assess the advantages and disadvantages of a strategy given the
capabilities and resources of an adversary or series of adversaries. 58 Mix-
tures of strategies or random choices are also available. 5 9 Games of imper-
fect information, most similar to real life, involve ignorance or error about
the content of one's adversaries' prior moves and as to their available
resources.6 0
Game theory also has something to say about the interactions of large
nations subject to a governing framework like the United Nations, or other
"balance of power" treaty arrangement. Alexander Hamilton once argued
that one of the most powerful nations on earth, France, was interfering so
often and so effectively in its neighbors' affairs that these powers would
"make common cause to resist and control the state which manifests a dis-
position so suspicious and exceptionable." 61 Game theory bears out Ham-
ilton's observation that the arbitrary and oppressive actions of large
nations may violate the independence interests of smaller neighboring
nations and invite coalitions of other nations to retaliate. 62
54. See MELVIN DRESHER, GAMES OF STRATEGY: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 1, 145
(1961), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/commercial-books/
2007/RANDCB149-1.pdf.
55. See id. at 145.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 2, 150.
58. See id. at 4.
59. See id. at 4-5.
60. See id. at 13-15.
61. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 2, in THE FEDERALIST 415 (Hallowell ed.,
1852).
62. See, e.g., ADRIAN HYDE-PRICE, EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
49-51 (2007); see also Matteo Dian, Dilemmas of the Asymmetry: The Evolving Dynamic
of the Alliance between the US andJapan 3-6, 13-14, 24-26 (2010), (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) (citing, inter alia, Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under Security
Dilemma, 30 WORLD POLITICS., no. 2 (Jan. 1978); James D. Morrow, Arms Versus Allies:
Trade-offs in the Search for Security, 47 INT'L ORG. 207, 215 (1993); Mancur Olson, Jr. &
Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 REv. EcON. & STAT. 266, 273
(1966); ROBERT E. OSGOOD, ALLIANCES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1968); Bruce
M. Russett, An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances, 15 MIDWEST J. POL.
Sci. 262, 270-72 (1971)). Paul W. Schroeder calls this dynamic one of the four key
strategies of international relations: "seeking protection." Paul W. Schroeder, The Neo-
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Game theory posits that in the absence of a credible threat of retalia-
tion by other sufficiently powerful nations, a large nation may succumb to
the temptation to violate international law to achieve its short-term prefer-
ences.63 In this respect, compliance with international law is understanda-
ble as a prisoner's dilemma: while universal compliance with international
law would result in the best outcome overall, a given nation's optimal strat-
egy is to violate international law, regardless of whether the other nation
will comply, if the first nation believes that this will be a single confronta-
tion, without expectation of a recurrence. This helps to explain why some
nations destroy other nations completely, preventing the opportunity for
the smaller or weaker nation to retaliate in the future.
When nations have repeated interactions (or "iterations" in game the-
ory terms), such as those pursuant to the U.N. Charter or a free-trade
agreement, cooperation and compliance may emerge as a given nation's
optimal strategy, so long as nations punish one another's violations of the
pact fairly consistently.64
A provocative example of a wargame is the Army Transformation War-
game of 2000.65 It involved a hypothetical war in 2015 between NATO and
a combined Iran and Iraq over access to water at the headwaters of the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Syria and Turkey, and multiple moves
including warfare and post-conflict operations. 66 In the wargame, the
Chief of Staff of the Army had implemented a strategy aimed at preserving
"full spectrum" dominance. 67 Other notable wargames include the Japa-
nese wargame of 1940-1941 in anticipation of the attack on the United
States and the waging of World War II, and the U.S. wargame of 1955 simu-
lating nuclear war with the Soviet Union in the period leading up to
1958.68
A wargame more analogous to modeling the risks posed by the Arab
Spring is the "Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment" program of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. It was designed to "develop
and demonstrate specific, predictive technology to better anticipate and act
against terrorists" by "identifying predictive indicators of terrorist-specific
Realist Theory of International Politics: A Historian's View, ACDIS OCCASIONAL PAPERS
(2001).
63. George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Super-
game: Order and Law 13-14, 20-22, 36 (Tufts Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper, Mar.
2004), available at ase.tufts.edu/econ/research/documents/2004/papersl5.pdf.
64. Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal
Remedies, "Legalized Noncompliance," and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REv. 243, 255
(2011).
65. See WALTER PERRY ET AL., RAND CORP., A REPORT ON ARMY TRANSFORMATION WAR-
GAME OF 2000 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono-
graph reports/2007/MR1335.pdf.
66. See id. at xi, xiv.
67. Id. at 1.
68. ROBERT D. SPECHT, RAND CORP., WAR GAMES 1-5, 14-15 (1957), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2005/P1041.pdf.
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attacks and behaviors" in a cultural and ideological context.69 It developed
an early warning model that was used "operationally, to predict an active
terrorist group's next action (attack/no attack, target characteristics, loca-
tion characteristics, tactical characteristics, timeframes, and motivating fac-
tors)."70 Among other techniques, it used data mining to extract
signatures of terrorist operations.7 ' Although a comparable data analysis
was not possible to conduct in this Article, the approach of deriving early
warning of future events which may require the United Nations and its
member states to act, motivates much of the analysis that follows.
This Article attempts to conduct a broad-based analysis of the possible
course of the Arab Spring and necessary responses by the United Nations
and other actors. It draws on the lessons of strategic planning by war-
games in the past, including: accounting for adversaries' available
resources in planning responses, mining as much information as possible
for trends and styles of adversary operations, and conducting a multi-move
and multi-actor analysis of potential ramifications of operations and strate-
gies. Taking a page from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
it also seeks to develop templates that will make U.N. responses to the Arab
Spring and related humanitarian and human rights crises more effective.72
III. The Spark, Tunisia 2011
Tunisia was perhaps the most highly developed country in Africa at
the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The World Bank reported in 1977 that
that the country had experienced "'rapid economic growth with increas-
ingly equitable distribution of its benefits." 73 As illustrated in Table 2, it
enjoyed perhaps the highest standard of living in all of Africa, rivaled per-
haps only by Libya.
69. DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA), DARPA FACT FILE: A
COMPENDIUM OF DARPA PROGRAMS 5 (2002), available at http://web.archive.org/web/
2003040702571 1/http://www.darpa.mil/body/NewsItems/pdf/DARPAfactfile.pdf.
70. Id.
71. Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology and Data Mining, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 389, 396
(2004) ("TIA's Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment (WAE) project, which was
aimed at developing models of terrorist behavior, appeared to exemplify 'true' data min-
ing: it assumed that different terrorist groups have distinct 'styles' or 'signatures' that
can be identified in the transaction space .... .").
72. See Roy S. Lee, Panel on Peacekeeping: Legal and Political Issues, 8 ILSAJ. INT'L &
Comp. L. 431, 442 (2002).
73. HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI ACCORDS, AND THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORTS SUBMITrED TO CONGRESS BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 417 (Igor
Kavass & Jacqueline P. Granier eds., 1982).
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Table 2 - Human Development in North Africa in 2008
(Unless Otherwise Noted)74
Tunisia Libya Egypt Morocco Algeria Sudan
Total life expectancy at birth 74.3 72.3 72.3 72 71 57P
(years)
Male life expectancy at birth 72.4 70.2 69.9 71.6 70 58(years)
Infant mortality rate (per 18.4+ 14 17 32.2P 36 81*1,000 live births)
Under five mortality rate (per 22 19+ 21.8 37.9 41 1121,000 live births)
Maternal mortality ratio (per 36 23 55 227 180- 110710,000 live births)
Total expenditure on health 6 3.5 6.4 5.3 4.4 3.6(% of GDP)
Adult literacy rate 15+ years, 78 89 71* 56+ 75P 50-
Gross secondary school 75+ 110* 92* 44 95+ 30'
enrollment ratio - total (%)
Key
'=2001 =2005
=2002 *...2006
- = 2003 o 2007
P 2000-2007 2011
In 2010, however, Tunisia's living standards lagged considerably
behind those of some of the countries whose satellite television channels
were available in Tunisia, such as France, the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
or Saudi Arabia.75 Following neoconservative economic orthodoxy, Tuni-
sia had privatized state-owned enterprises and gradually reduced subsidies
for the necessities of life, without creating enough jobs or income to make
up for the reduced subsidies. 76 To make matters worse, food prices hit a
74. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH STATIsncs 2010 45-52, 61-65 (2010),
available at http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/ENWHS10jull.pdf; World Bank
Data: Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator (last visited Apr. 13,
2013) (select indicator by topic for data set); Country Profile: Libya, POLITY.ORG.ZA, http:/
/www.polity.org.za/article/libya-2009-11-09.
75. See World Bank Data, supra tbl.2.
76. See Emad Mekay, Tunisian Unrest Stirs Arab World, INTER PRESS SERVICE (Dec. 31,
2010), http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54010. For a description of neocon-
servative economic orthodoxy, and its disastrous impact on some other economies
where it had been tried, see, for example, ALEJANDRO FOXLEY, LATIN AMERICAN EXPERI-
MENTS IN NEOCONSERVATIVE ECONOMICS 184-87 (1983). One of the observed impacts is
that "essential food consumption per family for the poorer groups showed a reduction of
20% in real terms between 1969 and 1978" in Chile. Id. at 84. Another is a "marked"
increase in the inequality of consumption, generating instability. See id. at 15, 19, 21,
84. See generally GLOBALIZATION, NEO-CONSERVATIVE POLICIES, AND DEMOCRATIC ALTERNA-
TIVES. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN LOXLEY (Haroon Akram-Lodhi et al., eds., 2005).
Unemployment in Chile, for example, increased from 3% to more than 10%, with two
economic depressions in less than a decade, and a GDP in 1983 close to where it had
been in 1973, followed by strong growth after 1986. See Econ. Comm'n for Latin Am. &
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record high, fueled by China's rising share of world consumption of foods
and edible oils, and the use of biofuels by developed countries such as the
United States.77 These were warning signs of severe civil war in Rwanda
and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 78
On December 17, 2010, a fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set
himself on fire to protest government corruption after the police confis-
cated his produce because he was selling it without a permit, possibly
igniting the Tunisian revolution and its parallels elsewhere. 79 Political
commentator Hernando De Soto called Bouazizi a symbolic breadwinner
struggling to achieve success in a shadow economy, confronting the cor-
ruption of local officials, and suffering the seizure of six crates of fruit and
a public slap from a female police officer.80 Perhaps one hundred more
Tunisians imitated his example in the following six months.81 Newspapers
blamed economic malaise for the spreading self-immolation.82 By the end
of the month, "Arabs across the Middle East watched in awe as online video
posts and sporadic coverage on Al-Jazeera TV station showed Tunisians,
with a reputation of passivity, rise up in unprecedented street protests and
sits-in against the police state of President Ben Ali." 3 Blogs and tweets
provided real-time coverage of the unfolding protests.84 The opposition
alleged that the government used gunfire, mass arrests, raids, and torture
to fight back.85
The protests turned violent. In one town, 2,000 protesters fought with
police, "setting three police cars ablaze as well as the offices of the gov-
erning party and security services."86 Tunisian officials argued that a
"democratic state" could not allow "the use by certain extremists of prohib-
the Caribbean, Table 1.1.1.1, America Latina: Producto Interno Bruto (Table 1.1.1.1),
CEPAL (2010), available at http://www.cepal.org/deype/cuademo37/datos/1.1.1.1.xIs;
Walden Bello & John Kelly, The IMF and Chile: A Parting of Ways?, MULTINAT'L MONITOR,
(Apr. 1983), http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1983/04/bello.html.
77. Tom Gjelten, The Impact of Rising Food Prices on Arab Unrest, NPR (Feb. 18,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/18/133852810/the-impact-of-rising-food-prices-
on-arab-unrest?sc=17&f=1004.
78. See Dane Rowlands & Troy Joseph, The International Monetary Fund and Conflict
Prevention, in CONFLICT PREVENTION: PATH TO PEACE OR GRAND ILLUSION? 207, 209 (David
Carment & Albrecht Schnabel eds., 2003) (reviewing literature).
79. Nada Bakri, Self-Immolation is on the Rise in the Arab World, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/world/africa/self-immolation-on-the-rise-
in-the-arab-world.html; Elaine Ganley & Bouazza Ben Bouazza, Jobless Youths in Tunisia
Riot Using Facebook, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.business-
week.com/ap/financialnews/D9KMBTFGO.htm.
80. See Hernando De Soto, The Real Mohamed Bouazizi, FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 16,
2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/16/the_real_mohamed_
bouazizi.
81. See Bakri, supra note 79.
82. See, e.g., id.
83. Mekay, supra note 76.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Police Clash With Protesters in Tunisia, FOXNEws.COM (Dec. 25, 2010), http://
www.foxnews.com/world/2010/12/25/police-clash-protesters-tunisia/#ixzzlkGL3uK
wC.
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ited weapons such as Molotov cocktails and fire bombs and the throwing of
stones against people and public and private property."87 The U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for prosecutions of
police using excessive force, and "expressed concern over reports of wide-
spread arrests, including of human rights defenders and bloggers advocat-
ing fundamental human rights principles such as the freedom of
expression, as well as reports of torture and ill-treatment of detainees."88
She argued that the Tunisian government should "draw up policies to ame-
liorate economic hardship and lift severe limitations on civil liberties,
including the freedoms of assembly, the expression of opinion and the
right to associate." 89
By January 19, Ms. Pillay believed that one hundred persons had died
in the Tunisian revolution. 90 As a result, however, President Ben Ali left
office, with a transitional government taking over and announcing plans
for democratic elections and the release of political prisoners by the end of
the year. 9 ' Three people had died in copycat riots in Algeria, and Libyan
President Muammar Gaddafi condemned the "unjustified chaos" con-
fronting Tunisia after Ben Ali's departure.92 Protesters continued to battle
police and stormed a police station in February after the deaths of four of
their own.93
Moncef al-Marzouki, the leader of a secular Tunisian party,94 became
the interim president of Tunisia.95 Yet the "Islamist" Ennahda Party won at
the polls, received "most of the important Cabinet posts," and has been
called "the most powerful group in the assembly" of Tunisia.96 The term
"Islamist" is a misnomer, however, for there are various forms of Islam that
do not require political coercion, as the mass media's usage of the term
suggests by linking it to fundamentalist political parties seeking to impose
religious law.97 A better term might be "jihadist," for jihadism is the belief
87. Tarek Amara, Tunisian Government Says 14 Killed in Clashes, REUTERS Jan. 9,
2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/09/uk-tunisia-protests-idUKTRE708OA2
20110109.
88. Tunisia: UN Human Rights Chief Calls for Halt to Use of Excessive Force Against
Protesters in Tunisia, ALLAFRICA.COM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/
201101120927.html.
89. Id.
90. Tommy Evans & Rima Maktabi, Protesters March in Tunis Amid Arab League
Fears, KPAX.com (Jan. 19, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.kpax.com/news/protesters-
march-in-tunis-amid-arab-league-fears/.
91. Borzou Daragahi, Tunisia's New Government to Investigate Ex-President's Finan-
cial Dealings, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/20/
world/a-fg-tunisia-protest-20110120.
92. Evans and Maktabi, supra note 90.
93. See Tunisia Demonstrators Storm Police Station in Retaliatory Attach 06.02.11,
YouTUBE (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watchv=v9RfkAOjqlw.
94. See Evans & Maktabi, supra note 90.
95. Osman El Sharnoubi, Tunisia Opposition Fear Ennahda Power Grab, AHRAM
ONLINE (Jan. 17, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/31906/World/
Region/Tunisia-opposition-fear-Ennahda-power-grab-.aspx.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., CHARLES ALLEN, GOD'S TERRORISTS: THE WAHHABI CULT AND THE HIDDEN
RooTs OF MODERN JiHAD 57 (reprint paperback ed., 2007) (noting that jihadism, as devel-
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that non-Islamic rulers, those who do not adhere to shari'a law, are illegiti-
mate and that all Muslims everywhere should fight against such rulers.98
This belief was radicalized further by Abdul Aziz bin Adbul-Rahman ibn
Saud, who mobilized the most "highly motivated" sectors of the Arabian
population, the Wahhabi fundamentalists and the Ikhwan or the "Broth-
ers," to "declare jihad on their mutual enemy, the non-Wahhabis" of Ara-
bia.99 Ibn Saud became the religious leader of the "Brothers," claiming to
be the representative of God on earth, and imposed upon them a strict
discipline organized around the promise of Paradise and the hatred of Shi'a
and other Muslims, even as he forged an opportunistic alliance with the
British Empire.' 00 The British oversaw the flight of the traditional ruler of
much of Arabia and the coming to power of Ibn Saud in his place.101
As one professor at Tunisia's Manouba University stated, the danger
for that country is "a new hegemony, a new authoritarian rule by one of
the representative parties .1.. ."102 As in Afghanistan and Iraq, the transi-
tion away from socialist autocracy in Tunisia has been characterized by a
series of attacks on women perceived not to be practicing jihadist chastity
in a proper manner. 0 3 And as in these countries, word is spreading that
the now-dominant party is being funded by individuals or institutions in
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.10 4 The leaders of the party also analo-
gize it to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey,105 which
threatened to deport the entire Armenian Christian population of the coun-
try if other nations recognized that most of Turkey's Christians had been
exterminated during and after World War 1.106 Tunisia under Ben Ali had
oped by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, marginalizes the Quran's calls for "charity,
tolerance, forgiveness, and mercy," and advocates "violence against all who stood in
Islam's way. Polytheists and pagans were to be given one opportunity to convert, and ...
[i]f they ... resisted they were to be killed."); id. at 55-57 (arguing that jihadism involves
the doctrine that departures from monkish restrictions on food, music, dancing, cloth-
ing, and forms of religious worship warrant killing or loss of property).
98. See NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIc STATE 33 (2008).
99. ALLEN, supra note 97, at 240-42.
100. See id. at 242-47.
101. See id., at 246, 252-53. "In return for the fabulous sum of five million pounds
sterling, Ibn Saud promised to have no relations with any third party and not to inter-
vene in the Persian Gulf." LAURENT MURAWIEC, PRINCES OF DARKNESS: THE SAUDI ASSAULT
ON THE WEST 166 (2005). Britain made him a Knight Commander of the Indian Empire.
See id. at 167. By way of comparison, Egypt budgeted only three million pounds per
year to provide 1.2 million soldiers and guards for British auxiliary units. See Egypt's
Plea for Independence, 304 THE LIVING AGE 336, 337 (1920).
102. Tunisians Fear Sharia-law State May Be Looming, RT.com (Jan. 14, 2012), http://
rt.com/news/university-ennahda-niqab-tunisia-777/.
103. Marianna Belenkaya, What Price Women's Rights in Tunisia's New Democracy?,
RT.com (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://rt.com/news/ennahda-party-country-jebali-
905/.
104. Aidan Lewis, Profile: Tunisia's Ennahda Party, BBC NEws (Oct. 25, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859.
105. See id.
106. See Christopher Hitchens, Shut Up About Armenians or We'll Hurt Them Again:
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's Latest Sinister Threat, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2010), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/fighting.words/2010/04/
shutup-about armenians orwellhurt them-again.html ("Just to be clear, then, about
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less than a 5% difference between male and female educational levels,
while Turkey under the AKP had more than a 10% difference.107 Family
law in Turkey is "grossly inequitable toward women," as in Saudi Arabia,
and worse than in Iraq or Iran.108
Meanwhile, the goal of the revolution, to provide jobs and the necessi-
ties of life to the poor and politically marginalized, has not been met, far
from it. Unemployment has nearly doubled from 13% to 20%.109
IV. The Pharaoh, Egypt 2011
Egypt shared a decent level of human development with Tunisia, but
lagged behind its peer countries on such metrics as median incomes and
wages in particular. Table 3 illustrates these disparities.
Table 3 - Economic Indicators in Key North African Nations in 2009
(Unless Otherwise Noted)110
Morocco Egypt Algeria Libya Tunisia Sudan
Unemployment Rate, 2009 9.1 9.4 10.2 13 13.3 14.9
GDP Per Capita, 2009 2,900 2,500 4,000 9,100 4,200 1,300
GDP Per Capita, 2010 2,800 2,700 4,600 10,900 4,200 1,500
Key
- = 2005
the view of Turkey's chief statesman: If democratic assemblies dare to mention the eth-
nic cleansing of Armenians in the 20th century, I will personally complete that cleansing
in the 21st!").
107. Valerie Hudson, The Worst Places to Be a Woman, FOREIGN POL. (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/24/the-worst.places-to-be a_woman.
108. Id.
109. Bouazza ben Bouazza, Tunisia Marks 1st Anniversary of Arab Spring, ABC NEWs
(Jan. 14, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/tunisia-marks-1st-anni-
versary-arab-spring-15360274.
110. Sources: Cent. Intelligence Agency, WORLD FACTBOOK 2010 (2010), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2010; World Economic
Outlook Database, Ir'L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/
2011/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx (last updated Aug. 2011) (select "All countries" and
then "Sudan"); Rana Jawad, Libya Grapples With Unemployment, BBC (May 5, 2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4515919.stm (Unemployment) (GDP Per Capita,
2009); GDP Per Capita, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Apr. 13, 2013) (GDP Per Capita, 2010). The CIA is the
source of the data for unemployment, which have been rounded to nearest tenth of a
percent, but other non-CIA data was used to update figures for Libya and Sudan. The
figures for Libya and Sudan come from the Libyan government and the International
Monetary Fund, respectively. The figures from sources such as the IMF or countries'
own estimates do not always match the CIA's World Factbook data. The CIA used a
figure of 30%, which is unlikely because Libya had a stronger economy than Sudan, by
far, according to the World Bank's GDP Per Capita figure. The IMF is the source of the
data for GDP per capita in 2009, which are expressed in constant U.S. dollars and have
been rounded to nearest $100. Except for Libya, the World Bank is the source of the data
for GDP per capita in 2010, which are expressed in nominal terms and have been
rounded to nearest $100. Figures for Libya in 2010 are from IMF.
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The Egyptian "Papyrus" revolution became known as a "Twitter revolu-
tion," with little papyrus on display."' Despite the European financial cri-
sis and the nuclear disaster in Japan, #egypt was the top hashtag on Twitter
for 2011.112 Egypt had a much more advanced social media culture than
did Tunisia or Libya during their revolutions.1 3 Egypt boasted the largest
number of active Twitter users of any country experiencing an Arab Spring
rebellion, with these users disproportionately based in Cairo, the site of the
Tahrir Square protests and related violence.114 When President Mubarak
flipped the Internet kill switch, Google and Twitter helped Egyptians to
continue sending tweets by means of voicemail." 5
On January 17, 2011, an Egyptian man named Abdou Abdel Moneim
immolated himself outside Egypt's Parliament building.116 Protesters pro-
claimed a "Day of Revolution" on January 25, 2011, with 90,000 Egyptians
announcing their intentions to participate on Facebook.11 7 Two days
before that, Egypt's Interior Minister, Habib el-Adly, "charged extremist
group the Army of Islam," a "militant group based in the Gaza Strip with
links to al-Qa'ida," with perpetrating an attack on a Coptic church that
killed more than twenty people."" A spokesperson for Hamas denied that
the Army of Islam was responsible." 9
The Twitter hashtag #jan25 and the accounts @Ghonim and
@SandMonkey became hubs for the exchange of information and virtual
epicenters of the growing movement for Mubarak to "Leave!" The protes-
ters gathered in Tahrir Square and attempted to storm the Egyptian Parlia-
ment on Jan. 25, the "Day of Revolution."1 20 Rock-throwing emerged as a
rebel tactic, with one police officer dying on January 26 and others battling
protesters until February 3.121 Egypt reissued its prohibition on public
gatherings and shut down the Internet for a time between January 28 and
February 3.122 Egypt had a long-standing policy of restricting access to
political Web sites and arresting and sanctioning bloggers and Internet
111. Peter Beaumont, The Truth About Twitter, Facebook and the Uprisings in the Arab
World, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/twit-
ter-facebook-uprisings-arab-libya.
112. Uri Friedman, The Egyptian Revolution Dominated Twitter This Year, FoREIGN
PoL. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/theegyptianrev
olution dominatedtwitterthis.year.
113. Beaumont, supra note 111.
114. See Friedman, supra note 112.
115. See Egypt, 65 MIDDLE E. J. 457, 468-69 (2011).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Cairo Egypt Protesters Attempt to Storm Parliament 25.01.2011, YouTUBE (Jan. 25,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watchv-nRjrBmHSVxO.
121. See id.; Jasiri X, We All Shall Be Free!, YouTUBE (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=mu7eQyasgwO.
122. See id.; Tiffany Hsu, Internet Restored in Egypt, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at B2;
Jennifer Preston et al., Movement Began with Outrage and a Facebook Page that Gave It an
Outlet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A10; James Cowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, RENESYS
BLOG (Jan. 27, 2011, 7:56 PM), http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-
the-internet.shtml; see also Jeremy Kirk, With Wired Internet Locked, Egypt Looks to the
94 Vol. 46
2013 Wargaming the "Arab Spring"
users for opposition to the government or the established Muslim faith.123
It had detained thousands of residents without trial for opposition political
or religious activity.124
Although most Egyptians focused their energies on peaceful aspects of
protests in Tahrir Square and other public places, other proponents of
regime change in Egypt certainly adopted violent methods. They stormed
and devastated the main police station, and set "a half dozen armored vehi-
cles on fire" in the Suez region on January 27.125 "Police opened fire on
1,000 Egyptian protesters trying to storm the Interior Ministry in Cairo on
Saturday," January 29.126 In February, in the Sinai region, revolutionaries
attempted once again to storm a police station, leading to the death of one
and the wounding of twenty.' 27
Thus, the facile narrative of peaceful protesters receiving merely rhe-
torical support from Western countries, forcing brutal dictators to step
down by virtue of the "people's power," does not really hold up.128 An
examination of the actual course of the Arab Spring reveals that this narra-
tive is overly simplistic and does not account for the facts. Violent means
came to the fore in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and other Arab
Spring countries. The violence in Egypt and Tunisia went beyond rock
throwing to the killing of police officers and the sacking and burning of
police stations and Interior Ministry buildings.129 In Libya and Syria, as
discussed below, full-blown civil war broke out, based initially in eastern
Libya near the Egyptian border, and in Syria near the Lebanese and Iraqi
borders.130 In Egypt, the violence continued after President Mubarak
Sky, PC WORLD (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/218064/with-wired_
internetlocked.egypt-looks to-thesky.html; Internet Censorship.
123. See U.S. DEPT ST. 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: EGYPT (2010), available at http://
state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/ 136067.htm.
124. See id.
125. See Hannah Allam, Protesters in Suez, Egypt Storm, Sack Main Police Station,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/28/
108257/protesters-in-suez-egypt-storm.html.
126. Live Updates - Egypt Unrest, TIMEs INDIA Uan. 30, 2011, 6:09 AM), http://arti-
cles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-30/middle-east/28354153_1_egypt-unrest-
egypt-s-brotherhood-orderly-transition/3.
127. See Triumph As Mubarak Quits, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011211164636605699.html.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Tunisia Unrest Spreads to Capital, AL-JAZEERA (Jan. 11, 2011), http://
www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2011/01/2011111214716877786.html ("Police have
fired into the air to disperse rioters ransacking buildings in a suburb of Tunisia's capital
.... [Hiundreds of youths threw stones at police before smashing shops and setting fire
to a bank."); Allam, supra note 125; Ernesto Londotio, Ousted Police Officers Set Fire to
Egypt's Interior Ministry, WASH. PosT (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/ousted-police-officers-set-fire-to-egypts-interior-ministry/2011/02/23/
ABIZcZQ.story.html (noting that "demonstrators set roughly half a dozen vehicles
parked outside the ministry on fire" and "lobbed molotov cocktails toward" the Interior
Ministry); Two Gunmen Shot Dead in Tunisia, RTt NEWS (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.
rte.ie/news/2011/0116/tunisia.html.
130. See Jon Lee Anderson, Sons of the Revolution, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2011, at 42
(stating that Libyan rebellion emerged in Benghazi, near the Egyptian border, to which
Westerners fled); Nibras Kazimi, Handing Jihadis Cause, NEWSWEEK INT'L, May 9, 2011;
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stepped aside for a military regime to take over and conduct elections, with
police stations attacked throughout the spring and summer of 2011, and
the Israeli embassy in Cairo sacked in the fall, after a border skirmish
killed five Egyptian soldiers.131
The violent character of the Arab Spring should not necessarily be a
surprise. President Obama's Cairo speech portrayed revolutions "from
South Africa to South Asia; from eastern Europe to Indonesia" as similar to
the U.S. Civil Rights Movement in that they were all based upon "peaceful
and determined insistence upon the ideals at the centre of America's
founding."13 2 Yet the reality of revolution in South Africa and South Asia
was more violent than is widely thought. Recent scholarship on the road to
South Asia's independence from the British Empire and the creation of the
states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, and Afghanistan
documents a bloody and quarrelsome process in which hundreds of
thousands died.133 Revolutionary violence in South Asia and South Africa
was widespread and claimed thousands of lives, including frequent inci-
dents in which revolutionaries burned regime loyalists alive (sometimes
called "necklacing").134 After independence, hundreds of thousands of
persons in South Asia lost their lives to genocide, civil war, and structural
violence such as denial of adequate health care.' 35 They were joined by
hundreds of thousands more who perished unnecessarily from HIV/AIDS
due to corruption and neglect in South Africa.136 Life expectancy in South
Ben Knight, Syrian Clamps Down on Rebel Cities, Ausu.. BROADCASTING CORP. PREMIUM
NEws, Aug. 11, 2011; Syrian Rebels Form National Council, UPI, Aug. 24, 2011; Eric
Watkins, Sanctions, Saboteurs Take Toll on Syria's Oil Industry, 109 OIL & GAS J., Nov.
14, 2011, at 25, 25; Paul Wood, Revolution or Civil War?, SPECTATOR, Dec. 3, 2011, at 17.
131. See Sami Aboudi & Mohamed Abdellah, Egyptians Attack Israel Embassy, Ambas-
sador Said to Flee, ALERT NET (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/
egyptians-attack-israel-embassy-ambassador-said-to-flee ("Hundreds of Egyptians
stormed the building housing Israel's mission in Cairo and threw embassy documents
and its national flag from windows, while airport sources said on Saturday that Israel's
envoy was set to fly out of the country."); Egyptian Army Arrests 15 in Sinai Clashes,
MONSTERS & CRITICS (July 30, 2011), http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/mid-
dleeast/news/article_1654070.php/Egyptian-army-arrests-15-in-Sinai-clashes ("Around
150 people, reported to be Islamists and carrying black flags reading 'There is no God
but God,' tried to storm the police station . . . . They were wearing black outfits and
shouted slogans that called for 'turning Sinai into an Islamist emirate.'").
132. Full text: Barack Obama's Cairo Speech, supra note 8.
133. See, e.g., TRAVis, supra note 9, at 347-48.
134. See Lionel Baixas, Thematic Chronology of Mass Violence in Pakistan, 1947-2007,
ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA MASS VIOLENCE (June 24, 2008), available at http://www.massvi-
olence.org/fr/IMG/articlePDF/Thematic-Chronology-of-Mass-Violence-in-Pakistan-
1947-2007.pdf; Paul R. Brass, The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Pun-
jab, 1946-47: Means, Methods, and Purposes, 5 J. GENOCIDE RES. 71, 90 (2003); SA TRUTH
& RECONCILIATION COMM'N, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: HOLDING THE ANC
ACCOUNTABLE (Mar. 2003) (S. Mr.), at 654-56, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
otherdocs/2003/trc/5_3.pdf.
135. See, e.g., TRAvIs, supra note 9, at 376-88, 434.
136. See Clare Nullis, AIDS Said Cuts S.Africa Teens' Life Span, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/30/
AR2006113000649.html; Don't Get Ill, ECONOMIST, June 5, 2010, at 15; South Africa and
AIDS: Getting to Grips, ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/
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Africa declined by ten years under democracy.' 3 7
Many of the examples of successful protest movements leading to the
secure enjoyment of human rights and democracy fall apart on closer
inspection. For example, Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall look to Russia
and Eastern Europe, India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa. Just about every
one of them proves that nonviolent resistance alone is not very effective,
and in many cases, conditions deteriorate after a transition to democracy
without human rights or an independent judiciary. Starting with Sri
Lanka, Ackerman and DuVall admit that nonviolent action had little effect,
instead bringing about legal reforms characterized by even more discrimi-
nation against the Tamil minority.138 They blame the Tamil Tigers for
making the situation worse with an armed rebellion, but the government
continued to deny the Tamils human rights and political freedoms after the
Tamil Tigers were defeated in a massacre of tens of thousands of Tamils in
2009.139 With regard to Russia and Eastern Europe, Ackerman and DuVall
fail to mention that ten to twenty countries, including some of the largest
on earth, attacked the Soviets in Afghanistan for over a decade, causing
13,000 to 30,000 battle deaths, contributing to 450,000 Soviet wounded
and sick, and wasting so much money and manpower that the Soviet
Union's GDP growth rate averaged 3.5% in the 1970s but 1.9% in the
1980s.140 Much of Eastern Europe was liberated as a result of Soviet scle-
rosis or inability to retain the western colonies. 14' In the case of Yugosla-
via, the dictatorship fell after a massive NATO bombing campaign that
killed hundreds and left thousands hungry and cold.142 Prior to a demo-
cratic transition, a massive international military campaign to support the
rebels in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo against the federal government, sup-
ported by dozens of countries including NATO and the Organization of the
Islamic Conference, reduced Yugoslavia to the rump of Serbia and
Montenegro.14 3
17633289; Bruce Walker, Public Health Maternity Horrors in South Africa, NEW AM. (Aug.
9, 2011), http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/africa/item/8340-public-
health-maternity-horrors-in-south-africa.
137. See Improving South Africa's Health System, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO (Feb. 12, 2010),
http://www.southafrica.info/about/government/stateofnation2010-health.htm.
138. See PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE POWERFUL: A CENTURY OF
NONVIOLENT CONFLICT 461 (2000).
139. See HOWARD ADELMAN & ELAZAR BARKAN, No RETURN, No REFUGE: RITES AND
RIGHTS IN MINORITY REPATRIATION 120 (2011); Basic Rights Violated in Sri Lanka: Rights
Group, WEEKEND LEADER (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2012/01/25/
basic-rights-violated-in-sri-lanka-rights-group/.
140. See CARMEL DAVIS, POWER, THREAT, OR MILITARY CAPABILITIES: US BALANCING IN THE
LATER COLD WAR, 1970-1982 22-23 (2011); WILLIAM E. ODOM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE
SOVIET MILITARY 249 (1998); Afghanistan, 13 WORLD AFF. REP. 75, 75 (1983).
141. See BRUCE A. ELLEMAN, MODERN CHINESE WARFARE, 1795-1989 296 (2001).
142. See RICHARD GARFIELD, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND [UNICEF], ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS, HEALTH, AND WELFARE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1990-2000
46 (2001), available at http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/files/FRY_01-013.pdf; Alex-
andra Niksic, Serbia Shivering Under Severe Power Cuts, RELIEFWEB (Dec. 26, 2000),
reliefweb.int/node/73509.
143. See TRAVIS, supra note 9, at 62-75, 82-85.
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Other studies purport to show that "civic resistance" is more effective
than violent revolution in producing democratic change; yet many of the
80% of states allegedly experiencing nonviolent democratic change were
not actually free countries after the transition, such as Belarus, Cambodia,
Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.144 All that such stud-
ies can show is that "civic resistance" was a "key factor" in 70% of transi-
tions, many of which did not result in robust political freedom or fair
democracies, notably in Colombia, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Niger, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Uganda.145 Civic protest more often fails
without international or domestic military conflict, notably in the Soviet
Union under Stalin, China under Mao, Cambodia under Pol Pot, Uganda
under Idi Amin, Pakistan and Bangladesh under Yahya Khan, Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito and Slobodan Milosevic,
Afghanistan under the Taliban, and North Korea under the Kim family.
On January 31, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for an
"orderly transition" to democracy in Egypt.146 The next day, after barely
two weeks of serious protest and conflict, President Obama asked Egyptian
Hosni Mubarak to leave office, despite the risk that Mubarak and his fam-
ily would face criminal trials.147 President Mubarak transferred power to a
military junta on February 11, in what some have described as "The Fall of
the Pharaoh" or the "The Downfall of the Last Pharaoh in the Square."' 48
Several scholars have argued that during the Arab Spring, the United
States arrived at a complicated partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood
and even Al-Qaeda veterans in Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere that contributed
to the fall of secular regimes (by regional standards) with potentially cata-
strophic results. Testifying before a commission in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, Egyptian activist Cynthia Farahat accused the Obama
administration of "supporting the Muslim Brotherhood" and said that this
policy should stop, for the "founders of Hamas and Al-Qaeda are not mod-
144. See ADRIAN KARATNYCKY & PETER ACKERMAN, FREEDOM HOUSE, How FREEDOM IS
WON: FROM Civic RESISTANCE To DURABLE DEMOCRACY (2005), available at http://agnt.
org/snv/resources/HowFreedomisWon.pdf; Erica Chenoweth & MariaJ. Stephan, Mobil-
ization and Resistance: A Framework for Analysis, in RETHINKING VIOLENCE: STATES AND
NON-STATE ACTORS IN CONFLICT 249, 271 (Erica Chenoweth & Adria Lawrence eds.,
2010) ("In a 2005 study of 67 regime transitions between 1973 and 2000, Adrian
Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman find that among" forty cases of "nonviolent civic coali-
tion[ I" change, 80% "were classified as 'free' at the time of the study.").
145. KARATNYCKY & ACKERMAN, supra note 144, at 6, 22-23.
146. Live Updates - Egypt's Unrest, supra note 126.
147. See Robert Dreyfuss, Obama and Egypt's Revolution, NATION (Feb. 14, 2011, 8:47
AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/158533/obama-and-egypts-revolution. Mubarak
is presently serving a life sentence after a trial focused on the deaths of anti-regime
protesters. Trials may be forthcoming for members of the military who replaced
Mubarak, on the basis that Egyptian security forces killed another hundred protesters
and persons engaged in anti-government "clashe[s]" after Mubarak's ouster. Egypt Panel
Implicates Mubarak, Military in Deaths, YNETNEWS.COM (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.
ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4328018,00.html.
148. See Dina Shehata, The Fall of the Pharaoh: How Hosni Mubarak's Reign Came to an
End, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 26, 26 (2011); The Downfall of the Last Pharaoh in the Square -
Egypt, YouTUBE (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watchv-=hxOx-zbR5g.
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erate and [the United States] should not be engaged in talks with them."14 9
On February 3, President Obama asked for President Mubarak to achieve a
transition with "a broad representation of the Egyptian opposition."1 50
President Obama argued that "Egyptians from all walks of life" had
"demanded their universal rights" and displayed "the moral force of non-
violence that has lit the world from Delhi to Warsaw, from Selma to South
Africa . . . ."151 Despite the rhetoric suggesting that Egypt's transition will
bring about universal human rights, some commentators argued that it
threatened to empower a political party with a record of supporting female
genital mutilation. 152
Egypt is a key prize in the war between Al-Qaeda and the United
States. The Bush-era National Strategy for Combating Terrorism described
a strategy to deny terrorists state sanctuary or the "control of any nation
they would use as a base and launching pad for terror," and to promote
"effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terror-
ism .... ."153 Presidents Bush and Obama had the resource of the Egyptian
military to draw upon to achieve this goal, as the United States armed the
military' 54 and relied upon it to act "responsibly as a caretaker to the
state . . . to ensure a transition that is credible in the eyes of the Egyptian
people."155 The United States sent between dozens and hundreds of terror
suspects to Egypt despite a "high risk of torture" by such methods as elec-
tric shock, beatings, and threats.' 56
149. Egyptian Activist to Obama: Stop Supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, US ACTION
NEws (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:09 PM), http://usactionnews.com/2011/12/egyptian-activist-to-
obama-stop-supporting-the-muslim-brotherhood/.
150. Dreyfuss, supra note 147.
151. Full Transcript of Obama's Speech at UN General Assembly, HAARETZ (Tel Aviv)
(Sept. 21, 2011, 5:09 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/full-tran-
script-of-obama-s-speech-at-un-general-assembly-1.385820.
152. See Mona Eltahawy, Why Do They Hate Us?, FOREIGN POL'Y (May/June 2012),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why-do-theyhate-us ("[Miore
than 90 percent of ever-married women in Egypt - including my mother and all but one
of her six sisters - have had their genitals cut in the name of modesty . .. .W]hen
Egypt banned the practice in 2008, some Muslim Brotherhood legislators opposed the
law.").
153. Overview of America's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, supra note 31.
154. See AMNESTY INT'L, ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: LES-
SONS FOR AN EFFECTIVE ARMS TRADE TREATY, 25-35 (2011), available at http://www.
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/1 17/201 1/en/049fdeee-66fe-4b13-a90e-
6d7773d6a546/act301172011en.pdf; USA Arming Egyptian Security Forces for Brutal
Crackdown, AMNESTY INT'L (Dec. 7, 2011), http://amnesty.ie/news/usa-arming-egyptian-
security-forces-brutal-crackdown; Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch, Time to Abandon
Autocrats and Embrace Rights: the International Response to the Arab Spring, in WORLD
REPORT 2012 1, 12 (2012) available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012.
155. Dreyfuss, supra note 147.
156. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transat-
lantic Relations: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Org., Human Rights,& Over-
sight & the Subcomm. on Eur., of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 (2007)
(statement of Amnesty International), available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/politics/documents/transcript012911.pdf; AMNESTY INT'L, EGYPT - SYSTEMATIC
ABUSES IN THE NAME OF SECURITY 5 (2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
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The leaders of Al-Qaeda also emphasized state-formation on their side.
Ayman al-Zawahiri argued in 2005 that the aim was "a Muslim state ... in
the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world," especially in
Egypt.' 5 7 As one well-informed observer argued in 2011,
[All Qaeda's true strategic dilemma lies in Egypt and Tunisia. In these coun-
tries, local tyrants have been ousted, but parliamentary elections will be held
soon, and the United States remains influential.
The outcome in Egypt is particularly personal for Zawahiri, who began his
fight to depose the Egyptian government as a teenager. Zawahiri also under-
stands that Egypt, given its geostrategic importance and its status as the
leading Arab nation, is the grand prize in the contest between al Qaeda and
the United States. In his recent six-part message to the Egyptian people and
in his eulogy for bin Laden, Zawahiri suggested that absent outside interfer-
ence, the Egyptians and the Tunisians would establish Islamic states that
would be hostile to Western interests. But the United States, he said, will
likely work to ensure that friendly political forces, including secularists and
moderate Islamists, win Egypt's upcoming elections. And even if the
Islamists succeed in establishing an Islamic state there, Zawahiri argued, the
United States will retain enough leverage to keep it in line. To prevent such
an outcome, Zawahiri called on Islamist activists in Egypt and Tunisia to
start a popular (presumably nonviolent) campaign to implement sharia as
the sole source of legislation and to pressure the transitional governments to
end their cooperation with Washington.15 8
Zawahiri's plan appears poised to come to fruition in 2012, as the
economy tanks and fundamentalist religious parties seize the Egyptian par-
liament and prepare to declare war on Israel and coerce the Egyptian popu-
lation to obey even more strict religious laws.15 9 Israel's navy intercepted
tons of weapons on the way to terrorists in Gaza by way of Egypt in 2011
and 2012.160 As in Iraq, kidnapping of non-Arabs and attacks on gas pipe-
lines were on the rise, both developments that could deepen a foreign-
exchange crisis.161 In August 2011, terrorists in the Sinai Peninsula killed
ten soldiers and civilians.16 2 In a "humanitarian disaster," Egyptians tor-
library/asset/MDE12/001/2007/en/27dc4dc8-d3c5-1ldd-8743-d3O5bea2b2c7/mdel2
0012007en.pdf.
157. McCants, supra note 19, at 27.
158. See id. at 31.
159. See Oren Dorell & Sarah Lynch, Christians Fear Losing Freedoms in Arab Spring
Movement, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/
2012-01-30/arab-spring-christians/52894182/1?csp=34news; Samuel Segev, Peace
Treaty in Peril, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS Uan. 24, 2012), http://www.winnipegfreepress.
com/opinion/westview/peace-treaty-in-peril-137946183.html.
160. See Yaakov Katz, IDF Boards Ship Allegedly Smuggling Arms to Gaza, JERUSALEM
PosT (Apr. 22, 2012), http://wwwjpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=267103.
161. See McCants, supra note 19, at 20 (describing foreign-exchange crisis); Bradley
Hope, Deep in the Sinai, a Looming Crisis Threatens Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, NAT'L (UAE)
(Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/deep-in-the-sinai-a-
looming-crisis-threatens-egypt-israel-peace-treaty (describing kidnappings and pipeline
bombings).
162. See Shuki Sadeh, A Fence, but not a Solution on the Israel-Egypt Border, HAARETZ
(Tel Aviv) (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/a-fence-but-
not-a-solution-on-the-israel-egypt-border-1.397627.
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tured African asylum-seekers passing through the Sinai to Israel. 163 Many
of the Africans were themselves fleeing religious persecution in Eritrea.164
As in both Iran and Iraq, Egyptian women were losing their freedoms
to dress as they chose and participate in public life.165 The Arab world's
most popular comedian, Adel Imam, received a prison sentence for poking
fun at jihadist characters in a film produced nearly two decades before the
Egyptian revolution.166 The economy, despite claims that the Arab Spring
would promote jobs and increase wealth in the Middle East and North
Africa,1 67 faced "collapse" as investment, tourism, and trade dried up.168
V. The "Cockroaches," Libya 2011
Like Tunisia, Libya enjoyed relatively high levels of economic activity,
health, education, infrastructure, and social welfare in 2010. It was in the
upper third or half of the world's countries in terms of certain public goods
that socialist and mixed-economy governments are known to provide well.
Table 4 provides a comparison of Libya and its neighbors according to U.N.
statistics on public goods:
Table 4 - Select Human Development Statistics for Libya and Its
Neighbors169
Libya Tunisia Algeria Egypt Sudan Niger Chad
Life expectancy at birth 74 74 72 70 58 51 49(years)
Child mortality rate (per 19 21 32 21 108 26 2091,000 live births)
Child malnutrition, 5% N/A 4% 6% 41% 19% 37%
underweight (percentage)
Per capita daily calorie 3,144 3,312 3,104 3,163 2,266 2,306 2,040intake (calories)
Proportion of
undernourished in total <5% <5% <5% <5% 22% 20% N/A
population (percentage)
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See Dina Sadek, Women in Egypt Heed Warning From Iranian Women on Rights,
GLOBAL PRESS INST. (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.globalpressinstitute.org/africa/egypt/
women-egypt-heed-warning-iranian-women-rights.
166. See Egyptian Actor Sentenced to Three Months in Jail for Defaming Islam, AL-
ARABIYA NEws (Feb. 2, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/02/192126.
html.
167. See, e.g., Elliott Abrams, A Forward Strategy of Freedom, FOREIGN POLIcY (Jan. 23,
2012), www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/23/aforward-strategy_0fofreedom.
168. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Struggling, Egypt Seeks Loan from I.M.F., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/world/middleeast/egypt-seeks-
3-2-billion-loan-from-imf.html.
169. FAQ Country Profiles, U.N. FOOD & AGRIc. ORG., http://www.fao.org/countrypro
files/default/en/ (select country from drop down list).
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However, Libya was known to be an epicenter of mass migration and
human rights violations, especially torture, long before the Arab Spring
ignited a regional revolt.170 For example, during the prison massacre at
Abu Salim in 1996, an estimated 1,200 prisoners were slain.171 Moreover,
Gaddafi also trained troops and commanders led by known war criminals
such as Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Sadiq al Mahdi, and Omar Hassan
al-Bashir, forces that later devastated villages in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Darfur.17 2
Nevertheless, the Arab Spring presented a conflict between legal obli-
gations to protect civilians and economic interests, however minor, in arms
deals with Libya. In 2009, "European Union nations approved sales of
$470 million in weapons to [Libya's] military .1.. ."73 The Obama admin-
istration approved $17 million in military sales to Libya in 2009 and
another $60-million transaction that would sell "50 refurbished armored
troop carriers to [the dictator's] army . . . ."17 One of the largest defense
contractors, BAE Systems, Inc., lobbied for the deal under the leadership of
its chairman of the board, retired General Anthony Zinni.17 5 Under the
Bush administration, the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls approved $46 million in "defense sales," including "$1 million in
explosives and incendiary agents .... "176 Previously, U.S. firms had sold
M113 troop transports to Libya.177
170. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, 2 COUNTRY REPORTS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2007
1972 (2008); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUSHED BACK, PUSHED AROUND: ITALY'S FORCED
RETURN OF BOAT MIGRANTS AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, LIBYA'S MISTREATMENT OF MIGRANTS AND
ASYLUM SEEKERS, 4-5, 7, 14 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/italy0909web_0.pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Libya: Forcible Return/
Torture and Ill-treatment (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
MDE19/014/2007/en/5e10c9b3-d36c-11 dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/mdel90142007en.
pdf; Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Libya: Forcible Return/Torture and Ill-treatment (Feb.
8, 2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/004/2007/en/
56dddcfc-d3b3-1ldd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/mdel90042007en.pdf; Press Release,
Amnesty Int'l, Reaction to News of UK 'No Torture' Deal with Libya (Oct. 18, 2005),
available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news details.asp?NewslD=16488.
171. See Libya: End Violent Crackdown in Tripoli, Hum. RTs. WATCH (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/13/libya-end-violent-crackdown-tripoli.
172. J. MILLARD BURR & ROBERT 0. COLLINS, DARFUR: THE LONG ROAD TO DISASTER
242-48 (2006); GERARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: A 2 1ST CENTURY GENOCIDE 51 (2008); Derek
Brown, Who Is Foday Sankoh?, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2000), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2000/may/17/sierraleone; Mahmoud Habboush, Sudan's Bashir Offers to Help
Form New Libyan Army, ALERTNET (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/
sudans-bashir-offers-to-help-form-new-libyan-army; Aislinn Laing, 'Blood Diamond' Trial:
The Case Against Charles Taylor, TELEGRAPH (June 16, 2011), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/liberia/8578540/Blood-diamond-
trial-the-case-against-Charles-Taylor.html.
173. Libya Army Transport Deal Frozen After US Approval, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 7,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/03/07/libya-army-transport-deal-frozen-
approval/.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
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Although these arms sales were measured in millions, the proceeds of
potential oil and gas deals with Libya promised billions. Amerada Hess,
ConocoPhillips, Marathon Oil, Occidental Petroleum, and Royal Dutch
Shell made "massive new investments" in Libyan oil fields in the later years
of the Bush administration.17 8 In 2001, the task force on U.S. energy
security convened by Vice President Dick Cheney targeted Libya along with
Iran and Iraq as important future sources of oil imports for the United
States, assuming sanctions against them could somehow be lifted.179 The
British and the Libyans reached an agreement in 2004 that called for Royal
Dutch Shell to develop $60 billion in natural gas reserves near the Mediter-
ranean coast of Libya. 80 The declines of stock indexes and of overall eco-
nomic activity in the late Bush administration contributed to plummeting
oil prices, which reached below $40 per barrel as President Obama took
office. 181 American payments to former Al-Qaeda allies in Iraq to bribe
them to stop fighting U.S. forces made investments in that country's oil
fields more stable, boosting estimates of future oil supplies substantially,
and arguably decreasing prices as a glut loomed.182 The rebound in stock
indexes and economic activity under President Obama led to soaring oil
prices,' 83 sending the price of Libyan crude oil above $120 per barrel
shortly after Libyan rebels seized certain oil-producing areas.' 84
In the wake of the 2004-2007 rapprochements between Libya and the
NATO countries, Al-Qaeda complained that "Libya has turned into a new
crusader base in the Islamic Maghreb, from which the bitter Christians can
reach out and crush any jihadist renaissance that rises in the face of the
178. See Christopher Helman, Is Libya Going to Boot U.S. Oil Companies?, FORBES (Jan.
22, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/22/libya-gaddafi-oil-biz-energy-cx-ch_0122
libya.html.
179. See GEORGE ORWEL, BLACK GOLD: THE NEW FRONTIER IN OIL FOR INVESTORS 86
(2006) ("On April 19, 2001, reporters Peter Behr and Alan Sipress of the Washington Post
wrote that Cheney's energy task force broached the possibility of lifting some economic
sanctions against Iran, Libya, and Iraq as part of a plan to increase America's oil
supply.").
180. See MARK ENSALACO, MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM: FROM BLACK SEPTEMBER TO SEP-
TEMBER 11, 185 (2008).
181. See David Goldman & Kenneth Musante, Oil Recovers After Volatile Session,
CNNMONEY (Jan. 20, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/20/markets/oil/.
182. Iraq's oil production rose from less than one million barrels per day after the
U.S. invasion in 2003 to about 2.4 million barrels per day in November and December
2008 as attacks on U.S. troops and helicopters declined and some measures of fatalities
with them. See Michael E. O'Hanlon & Ian Livingston, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, BROOKINGS INST., June 30, 2011, at 6-7,
14, 20, http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex.
183. The price of Brent crude oil (Europe spot price) began soaring a couple of
months after President Obama took office in January 2009. See FED. TRADE COMM'N,
BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: AN
UPDATE 5 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/09/110901gasolinepricere-
port.pdf. The price of Brent crude oil nearly doubled between 2009 and 2011. See U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2011 BRIEF: BRENT CRUDE OIL AVERAGES OVER $100 PER BARREL IN
2011 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4550.
184. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIEs, ENERGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, Figure
1: Brent Crude Oil Prices 2011-2012, available at www.energy.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/files/serve?File id=af90af4a-7d5b-4415-bflc-da99el5lf2dd.
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regimes of collaboration and its masters."185 InJanuary 2007, Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was formed from an Algerian terrorist organi-
zation ("Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat") on the model
of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and began to establish ties with Tunisian and Libyan
jihadists, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.18 6 During the
Bush administration, many North Africans "joined Iraq's insurgency; veter-
ans are apparently returning to wage jihad at home or in Europe."187 In
2006, Al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that AQIM would
be a "thorn in the neck of the American and French Crusaders and their
allies."188
On February 16, 2011, the Libyan opposition entered a new phase
when hundreds of protesters in Benghazi set fire to cars and threw petrol
bombs.' 89 The next day, a planned "Day of Rage" erupted in rebellion,
with battles in Benghazi and al-Bayda killing about two dozen Libyans.190
The Libyan government used text messages to threaten to shoot protesters
and rebels, and arrested writers and protesters.191 By February 19, more
than eighty Libyans had died as the government fired on rebels and protes-
ters.192 The government blocked access to Facebook and Al-Jazeera, and
denied electricity to selective areas.-9 3 Yet the opposition expanded to the
capital of Tripoli, where police and soldiers shot dozens of anti-government
activists.' 94 By February 20, Human Rights Watch put the death toll at
173.195
Events in Libya followed a pattern more closely resembling Yugoslavia
in 1991-1992 than the former Soviet Union in 1991-1992. Rather than
mostly peaceful protests, a regional secession began, centered in the east-
ern city of Benghazi.196 Britain, France, and the United States trained
rebel units and provided logistical support in April and early May. 197 The
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Sudan, and Turkey helped
consolidate rebel gains against the socialist regime, including gains by
rebels linked in significant part to international terrorist groups, until sys-
185. LAURA MANSFIELD, AL QAEDA 2007 YEARBOOK 328 (2007).
186. See Terror in the Maghreb: The Long Arm of Al-Qaeda, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2007),
http://www.economist.com/node/9009154.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see also ALEXIs ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21666, POLITICAL TRANSITION
IN TUNISIA 19 (2011), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=HduvWY8r8HOC
&pg=PA19 (AQIM "actively" recruiting Tunisians).
189. See Egypt, supra note 115.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Dan Murphy, Battles Erupt in Key Cities, Moving Libya Closer to Civil War,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2011/0304/Battles-erupt-in-key-cities-moving-Libya-closer-to-civil-war.
197. See 3 Western Powers Send Military Advisors to Libya, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110430101054/http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/world/la-fgw-libya-military-aid-20110421,0,3835596.story.
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tematic torture and massive alleged war crimes by the government against
civilian cities, bordering on "genocide," prompted the United Nations to
take action and NATO to begin bombing. 198 In July, Turkey and Qatar
recognized the Libyan opposition, the Libyan Transitional National Council
(LTNC), as the legitimate government, after France but before the United
States, Britain, and other NATO countries.199 Turkey provided an initial
$100 million in funding to the Libyan rebels, 200 and other OIC countries
like Qatar and Kuwait kicked in anti-tank weapons and $8-20 million in
daily funding for the rebels.201 Kuwait alone promised $180 million for
the LTNC. 202 The former European imperial powers in the region, France
and Italy, recognized the LTNC in March and pledged over $1 billion in aid
to the LTNC, backed by billions more in frozen Libyan assets.203 Qatar,
the UAE, and the OIC recognized the LTNC as the sole legitimate represen-
tative of the Libyan people in March, June, and July, respectively. 2 04 The
OIC had recognized other Muslim secessions from or rebellions against
majority secular, Christian, orJewish regimes, such as in Turkish-occupied
northern Cyprus, the Kosovo region of Serbia/Yugoslavia, the Turkish-
backed Hamas-governed Gaza Strip, and the U.N.-backed PLO-governed
West Bank.205
198. See TRAvis, supra note 9, at 27-53 (2010).
199. See Kim Chipman & Zaid Sabah, Turkey Recognizes Libyan Rebels, Gives $300
Million, AP Reports, BLOOMBERG (July 3, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
07-03/turkey-recognizes-libyan-rebels-gives-300-million-ap-reports.html; Libya Contact
Group Recognizes Libya's Rebels, HURRIYET DAILY NEws (July 15, 2011), http://www.hur-
riyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=world-leaders-open-talks-on-libya-
2011-07-15.
200. Turkey Sets Up $100 mln Fund to Help Libya Rebels, REUTERS (June 9, 2011), http:/
/www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/libya-rebels-turkey-idAFLDE7581UC20110609.
201. See Ian Black, Libyan Rebels Receiving Anti-tank Weapons from Qatar, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/14/libya-rebels-weapons-
qatar. Qatar signed a deal to export oil from rebel-held territory in amounts estimated
at 100,000 to 300,000 barrels per day at the price of $100 per barrel that prevailed
during the Arab Spring and until August 2011, netting about $10-30 million a day. See
Libyan Rebels Sign Oil Export Deal with Qatar, BBC NEws (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/business-12875810; Rowena Mason, Brent Crude Price Drops Below
$100, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/oilprices/
8692458/Brent-crude-price-drops-below-100.html.
202. See Nissar Hoath, Libya Rebels Win $1.4b Aid, KHALEEJ TIMES (UAE) (June 10,
2011), http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/international/
201 1/June/intemationalJune387.xml&section=international.
203. See id.; see also Italy Backs Libya Rebels, Dismisses Gaddafi Message, REUTERS (Apr.
4, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/us-bl-libya-italy-idUKTRE7331DO
20110404.
204. See Margaret Coker, Qatar Recognizes Libyan Rebel Council, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870455990457622834186073
0126.html#; UAE Recognizes Libya's TNC, EMIRATES 24-27 (June 13, 2011), www.emir-
ates247.com/news/world/uae-recognises-libya-s-tnc-2011-06-13-1.402387; Siraj Wahab,
World Recognizes Libyan Opposition, ARAB NEws (July 15, 2011), http://www.arabnews.
com/node/384093.
205. See Siraj Wahab, OIC Islamic Cooperation Chief Calls For 'Decade of Action', EURA-
siA REVIw (June 29, 2011), http://www.eurasiareview.com/29062011-oic-islamic-coop-
eration-chief-calls-for-decade-of-action.
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A sense of real emergency and a humanitarian crisis then began to
develop within the United Nations and the Libyan government. On Febru-
ary 21, Libya's deputy ambassador to the United Nations resigned and
warned of "genocide" due to the extent of the killings, saying, "the regime
of Qaddafi has already started the genocide against the Libyan people."206
He urged the United Nations to create a "no fly zone" to block mercenaries
from entering Libya. 207 The same day, three employees of the Libyan
embassy in Stockholm resigned in protest, stating publicly that they "con-
demn[ed] the genocide that is taking place in Libya against civilians as a
consequence of the legitimate demands for a life of dignity and without the
despot Qaddafi's continued misrule and corruption."208 The next day,
Muammar Gaddafi declared that the government would kill its opponents
"house by house," calling them "cockroaches" as groups of loyalists armed
with machetes and firearms boarded trucks in apparent preparation for
mass sweeps. 209 The activities of these units threatened civilians. Accord-
ing to witnesses:
Dozens of checkpoints operated by a combination of foreign mercenaries
and plainclothes militiamen lined the road west of Tripoli for the first time,
witnesses said, requiring not only the presentation of official papers but also
displays of flag-waving, fist-pumping enthusiasm for Colonel Qaddafi ....
"You are trying to convince them you are a loyalist," one resident said, "and
the second they realize that you are not, you are done for."2 10
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions, the U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser on the Prevention
of Genocide, and Human Rights Watch also condemned massive crimes in
Libya and called for action to prevent further killings.2 1 1 On February 23,
Turkey confirmed that it was carrying out the largest evacuation in its his-
206. Colin Moynihan, Libya's U.N. Diplomats Break With Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html?_r=0; see
also Libya's UN Mission Cuts Ties with Gaddafi, Warns Against Genocide, MONSTERS &
CRITCS (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/africa/news/arti-
cle_1620958.php/Libya-s-UN-mission-cuts-ties-with-Gaddafi-warns-against-genocide.
207. Id.
208. Libyan Embassy Staff Resign in Stockholm, LOCAL (Swed.) (Feb. 21, 2011), http://
www.thelocal.se/32178/2011022 1/.
209. See Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi's Grip on the Capital Tightens
as Revolt Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/
world/africa/23libya.html?pagewanted=all/.
210. Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi Massing Forces in Tripoli as
Rebellion Spreads, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/
world/africa/24libya.html.
211. Fresh Violence Rages in Libya, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/africa/2011/02/201122261251456133.html; Libya: "Stop the Massacre"-UN
Experts, RELIEFWEB (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/
EGUA-8EBURZ?OpenDocument; Press Release, UN Sec'y-Gen. Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Spec. Adviser on the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.un.
org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%2Special%2OAdvisers%2OStatement%
20on%2OLibya,%2022%20February%202011 .pdf; Libya: Commanders Should Face Jus-
tice for Killings, Hum. RTs. WATCH (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/
22/libya-commanders-should-face-justice-killings.
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tory, transporting more than 5,000 nationals from the airport in Tripoli,
with further evacuations planned for 25,000 Turks living in Libya. 212
On February 25, Libyan soldiers reportedly opened fire on crowds of
Libyans massing against the regime, killing up to 1,000.213 On February
26, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon cited estimates that more than
1,000 people had been killed in two weeks of protests in Libya. 214 That
day, the U.N. Security Council issued a resolution condemning crimes
against humanity in Libya, demanding an "immediate end to the violence,"
ordering U.N. members to prevent the sale of arms to Libya, noting that
refugees were being forced to flee, stating that a medical supplies shortage
had emerged, and expressing its "commitment to the sovereignty, indepen-
dence, territorial integrity and national unity of" Libya.2 1 5
On February 27, a National Libyan Council was formed, headed by a
Gaddafi-era official, former Justice Minister Mustafa Muhammad Abdel
Jalil.216 On March 12, the Arab League urged the Security Council to cre-
ate a no-fly zone in Libya and stated that the League would help implement
it.2 17 On March 18, the Council authorized not only a no-fly zone but also
"all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians, with five key U.N.
members abstaining: Russia, China, Germany, India, and Brazil.2 18 The
Council authorized member states, "acting nationally or through regional
organizations or arrangements . . . to protect civilians and civilian-popu-
lated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including
Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any
part of Libyan territory . . . ."219 The Council banned "all flights in the
airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect
civilians .... ."220
The Security Council also called upon Libya to "lift restrictions on all
forms of media." 221 In Libya, in contrast to Egypt, the government had
restricted Internet growth by banning private Internet service busi-
nesses. 222 The state-owned Internet company routed all wireline traffic to
and from Libya. 223 To stop the opposition from organizing, on March 4,
2011, the government flipped the "kill switch."224 This blocked people in
212. See Drew Hinshaw, Mass Libya Evacuations as Qaddafi Digs In, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/
0223/Mass-Libya-evacuations-as-Qaddafi-digs-in.
213. See Egypt, supra note 115, at 483.
214. See Suzan Fraser, Turkey's PM Speaks Out Against Libya Sanctions, U-T SAN DIEGO
(Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/feb/26/turkeys-pm-speaks-
out-against-libya-sanctions/.
215. S.C. Res. 1970, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
216. Egypt, supra note 115, at 483.
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218. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
219. S.C. Res. 1973, '1 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
220. Id. 9 6.
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government-held territories, such as Tripoli, from receiving wireline
Internet messages of support for the revolution from the outside world and
frustrated efforts to send images of the revolution out of the country.225
In March, Human Rights Watch claimed that the Libyan government
was "brutally suppressing all opposition in Tripoli, including peaceful pro-
tests, with lethal force, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappear-
ances . . . ."226 On March 10, a communique of the Peace and Security
Council of the African Union (AU) announced the creation of an ad hoc
AU High Level Committee on Libya.227 On March 12, the Council of the
League of Arab States sought a no-fly zone over Libya to create safe areas in
places exposed to shelling and to protect the Libyan people and foreign
nationals living in Libya. 228 Syria and Algeria, which suffered from the
threat of terrorism, "argued that foreign intervention would destabilize the
region."229 Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister who had over-
seen his country's ties to the Taliban, who had covered up for Al-Qaeda's
atrocities in the past, and whose nation's royal family had funded jihadism
and Al-Qaeda worldwide, 230 was a noteworthy participant in this Arab
League meeting. 231
The rush to intervention was not without its critics. On March 10,
2011, Alan Kuperman, an associate professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson
School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, appeared on KTBC tele-
vision in Austin, suggesting that there has been no massacres of civilians in
Libya; that if there had, it was due to the rebellion because peaceful resis-
tance movements do not incur massive retaliation against civilians; and
that the only legitimate basis for a U.N. or U.S. intervention is a deliberate
massacre. He said that if we "keep talking about intervening, we may esca-
late the civil war sufficiently to provoke just that sort of violence." 2 3 2 The
regime, in that case, "would fight to the very last civilian." 233 He suggested
that extremists were likely to take over the rebellion and that the United
225. See Dana Wollman, Internet Traffic in Libya Goes Dark Amid Upheaval, NBC
NEws (Mar. 4, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41911692/ns/technol-
ogy-and science-security/.
226. Libya: End Violent Crackdown in Tripoli, supra note 171 (internal quotations
omitted).
227. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 219.
228. Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over
Libya, N.Y. TimES (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/mid-
dleeast/13ibya.html?pagewanted=all.
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230. See Institutionalized Islam: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Policies and The Threat They
Pose: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Terrorism, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7
(2003); TRAvis, supra note 9, at 496-98, 523-25. When Saudi Arabia suffered terrorist
attacks that the West blamed on Al-Qaeda splinter groups in 2004, Prince Saud al-Faisal
claimed that it was the "Zionists" and "Israel" who had attacked the country instead.
Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 75-80 (2005).
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Nations and the United States should not support the rebellion when
peaceful change was possible, given that there was little violence during
regime change during the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.23 4
There are a couple of potential problems with Professor Kuperman's
analysis. First, a deliberate massacre of the entire population is not the
sole legitimate basis for the interventions that the U.N. Security Council
authorizes, as described in Part VIl.D. Second, many former officials of
Gaddafi's own regime called the massacres of Libyan people "genocide,"
and the discovery of mass graves in caverns near the secret prisons corrob-
orated their allegations that massacres had taken place. As the Pretoria
News reported at about this time:
Dungeons, executions, bombings, kidnappings and death squads targeting
civilians and journalists have left a country gripped by 42 years of fear
shaken to its core.
In Benghazi, which up until a few weeks ago was a scene of brutal fighting,
four secret bunker prisons in a security police compound have been
discovered.
The prisons housed hundreds of political activists, lawyers, teachers, jour-
nalists and civilians thought to be behind the planning of uprisings.
A maze of chambers nearly 30 metres underground, interlinked through
now cemented-up tunnels, the dungeons consist of mass cells and solitary
confinement cells no bigger than one square metre.
Also inside were solitary confinement cells, which resembled cages.
Evidence of sealed tunnels could be seen.
Those who were rescued have reported that it is in these chambers that
countless murdered activists are buried.23 5
In February, there had already been reports that Libyan aircrafts fired
on protesters in the capital Tripoli.23 6 This was before a full-fledged rebel-
lion emerged in the capital in March. On March 28, President Obama
remarked that if the NATO intervention had come later, "Benghazi . . .
could [have] suffer[ed] a massacre that would have reverberated across the
region and stained the conscience of the world." 23 7 This echoed what an
individual whom The Independent identified as a law professor wrote about
ten days earlier: "The global community must act to stop Gaddafi and his
234. See id.
235. Graeme Hosken, Dungeons Found in Libya, IOL NEws (Mar. 17, 2011, 9:13 AM),
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/dungeons-found-in-libya-1.1042986?showComments
=true.
236. Moynihan, supra note 206.
237. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/
03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya.
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forces reaching Benghazi. If he gets here, he will kill everyone . . . ."238 In
April, Libya's former oil minister accused Gaddafi of "ordering massacres
in which as many as 20,000 had been killed by government troops."239 On
March 17, Gaddafi gave his famous "no mercy" speech, which did, how-
ever, mention amnesty for rebels "who throw their weapons away." 240 That
day, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 on Libya. It condemned
Libya's "gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary
detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions." 2 4 '
The Security Council resolution expressed "concern at the plight of
refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular
Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign work-
ers, and calling on the international community to support those
efforts." 242 In the critical paragraph, it authorized "Member States ... act-
ing nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements . . . to
take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Ben-
ghazi . . . .243 By "excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on
any part of Libyan territory," however, the resolution seemed to be tailored
to authorize an intervention more similar to those in Haiti in 1993 or
Kosovo in 1999 than to the one in Iraq in 2003.244 The Council also
stressed the "important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating
to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region,"
under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.245
Two days later, President Obama reported to Congress that U.S. forces
had begun military operations in support of U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion 1973, "to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and address the threat
posed to international peace and security by the crisis in Libya."24 6 The
flight of Libyans to neighboring countries threatened to destabilize the
peace and security of the region, he argued. 247 The U.S. Africa Command
238. Hana El-Gallal, Hana El-Gallal: 'He Will Kill Everyone. Do Something. Please. . . ',
INDEP. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/hana-
elgallal-he-will-kill-everyone-do-something-please-2244162.html.
239. Michael Binyon, Deborah Haynes & Giles Whittell, Libya Oil Minister Says Up to
20,000 Civilians Massacred, AusmT. (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
news/world/libya-oil-minister-says-up-to-20000-civilians-massacred/story-e6frg6so-1226
035080080.
240. Walden Bello, The Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention, FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus
(Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.fpif.org/articles/thesCrisis ofhumanitarianintervention
(internal quotations omitted).
241. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 219, pmbl.
242. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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245. Id. 9 5.
246. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Letter from the Presi-
dent Regarding Commencement of Operations in Libya, (Mar. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-president-regarding-
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led the bombing of air defense systems, "command and control structures,"
forces, and airfields in Libya in order to establish a no-fly zone.2 48 One
goal was to stop Libyan government forces from taking the rebel cities of
Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zawiya. Another was to deliver "water,
electricity, and gas supplies to all areas."249 President Obama wrote,
"Qadhafi has forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and
created a serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protec-
tion .. ."250 On March 19, a communique of the OIC endorsed the NATO
intervention, among other things, and called upon OIC member states to
establish, subject to their discretion, contacts with the National Council
that Jalil founded. 25 1
The debate concerning whether the U.N.-sponsored intervention was
premature continued. In early April, Professor Kuperman told the Chicago
Tribune that "Gadhafi . . . did not massacre civilians in any of the other big
cities he captured-Zawiya, Misrata, Ajdabiya-which together have a popu-
lation equal to Benghazi. Yes, civilians were killed in a typical, ham-
handed, Third World counterinsurgency. But civilians were not targeted
for massacre."25 2 He distinguished the situation from that prevailing in
"Rwanda, Darfur, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bosnia, or
even Kosovo after NATO intervention."2 5 3  However, as Professor
Kuperman himself pointed out, the largest massacres in these countries
occurred between a year and several years after rebellion broke out, making
them questionable comparisons to Libya, where intervention to halt mas-
sacres began approximately two months after protests began. On April 13,
Kuperman wrote, "Misurata's population is roughly 400,000. In nearly
two months of war, only 257 people-including combatants-have died
there. Of the 949 wounded, only 22-less than 3%-are women." 25 4 This
point again ignores that the monthly death toll was probably not very high
in the early months of the Uganda-Rwanda and Yugoslavia-Kosovo con-
flicts of the 1990s. More importantly, in order to confirm the absence of
murders or massacres, as Professor Kuperman does, one should first prop-
erly conduct the following: (1) extensive trials and appellate proceedings
after forensic examinations of grave sites, such as those of Carla del Ponte
for Kosovo and the Iraqi High Tribunal for the Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mar. 19, 2011, Final Communique Issued
by the Emergency Open Ended Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Executive Committee on the
Alarming Developments in Libyan Jamahiriya (Mar. 19, 2011), available at http://
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Threat, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-
oped-0403-chapman-20110403,0,4286197.column (internal quotations omitted).
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in Iraq; (2) extensive interviews with refugees and town leaders, such as
those of Samuel Totten and the Darfur Atrocities Investigation Team, and of
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International prior to writing signifi-
cant reports;2 55 (3),an excess deaths study, such as those of the British
medical journal The Lancet for Iraq in 2004 and 2006256 and prior to that
for Kosovo, Sudan, and the DRC; and (4) a review of satellite photos and
published news reports, U.N. reports, and accounts by defectors, such as
those conducted by the nongovernmental organizations the Enough Project
and the Satellite Sentinel as well as various scholars in the Middle East
Studies field. There is also a questionable assumption that deliberately
targeting a city and knowingly killing civilians without deliberately target-
ing the civilians cannot be a war crime or crime against humanity. The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) rejected
this view in Prosecutor v. Strugar, which held that "to prove murder, it must
be established that death resulted from an act or omission of the accused,
committed with the intent either to kill or, in the absence of such a specific
intent, in the knowledge that death is a probable consequence of the act or
omission."257 In the Galic case, similarly, the ICTY convicted the accused
of murder as a crime against humanity for leading "a coordinated and pro-
tracted campaign of artillery and mortar shelling onto civilian areas of
Sarajevo and upon its civilian population."2 58
Professor Kuperman's analysis also omitted mention of certain evi-
dence of massacres, as well as the situation on the ground in Misrata and
Ajdabiya. On March 22, for example, a doctor in Misrata said that tanks
fired on peaceful civilians and that "[t]he number of dead are too many for
our hospital to handle . . . ."259 In March, the government reportedly sub-
jected Adjabiya to "full throttle shelling reprisals." 260 As one report stated:
"A powerful regime force advancing from the west has been relentlessly
bombarding Ajdabiya the past two days, raining rockets and artillery and
tank shells on the city . . . ."261
255. See GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN 223
(Samuel Totten & Eric Markusen eds., 2006).
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On March 18, International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo announced that he had enough evidence to issue an
arrest warrant for crimes against humanity in Libya by May. 262 On March
24, Moreno-Ocampo announced that he was "certain" that Libyan officials
would be charged with crimes against humanity, because his office had
evidence that "massive shooting of civilians" took place in Tripoli, Ben-
ghazi and other Libyan cities.2 6 3 He noted that "[tiechnology is reducing
the distance between people in Libya and people in the (rest of the) world,"
and that journalism portraying the plight of civilians in Libya had helped
trigger an international response. 264 On April 15, a rare joint article from
Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy called the siege of
Misrata an attempt "to strangle its population into submission" and a way
of "mercilessly targeting them," which, if accepted by the world, would be
an "unconscionable betrayal." 265 The next day, "Human Rights Watch
released photographs and testimony from its arms expert, which it said
confirmed witness reports that" cluster bombs were dropped on Misrata,
"indiscriminately throwing out dozens of high-explosive bomblets that
cause widespread damage and injuries over a large area." 266 On May 6,
Amnesty International reported that Libyan government snipers were
shooting at civilians. 267
On May 16, Moreno-Ocampo applied for an arrest warrant against
three Libyans who allegedly bore the most culpability for crimes against
humanity. 268 The evidence supporting a finding that crimes against
humanity meeting a high enough level of gravity had taken place so as to
trigger ICC jurisdiction, however, was redacted from the filing.269 When
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the ICC issued its warrant of arrest, much more evidence was forthcoming,
including:
1. the government arrested demonstrators, lawyers, and journalists in Ben-
ghazi and Tripoli between February 15 and 17, 2011, and tortured them
thereafter, including by electrocution and whipping;270
2. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi "order[ed] the imprisonment and elimination of
political dissidents," using resources that Muammar Gaddafi
supplied;27
3. the government incited violence against dissidents by using charged lan-
guage such as "sanitize," "filth," and "stray dogs" in televised speeches
and text messages, a practice which the ICC found to be
objectionable; 272
4. the government passed laws criminalizing propaganda against the
regime to set the stage for the violent suppression of dissent;273
5. the government blocked emails, the Internet, independent newspapers
and broadcast media, and international satellite television channels
such as Al-Jazeera to prevent the population from learning about the
ongoing suffering;274 and
6. in a cover-up campaign, the government removed dead bodies from the
streets and hospitals, and occasionally burned them.27 5
Between June and October, NATO's Operation Unified Protector
bombed Libyan government forces, especially in the vicinity of Benghazi,
and then followed rebel units as they moved west as "air support for anti-
Gaddafi forces." 276 Some NATO bombs killed civilians, although the gov-
ernment and rebels were not always wearing uniforms, including Col. Gad-
dafi and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi themselves. 277 Meanwhile, the United
States, Britain, France, Italy, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE trained and
armed the rebels, with Qatar sending hundreds of troops pursuant to a
U.S. demand for Arab participation in the U.N. mission.278 As an adviser
to President Obama explained in early 2012:
What the President decided is this. Is that we were willing to back a military
action if we could get a coalition together because we weren't going to do it
270. Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11-12, Pre-Trial
Chamber I Decision on the Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muam-
mar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi,
9 46 (June 17, 2011).
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unilaterally. We wouldn't put U.S. boots on the ground in another Muslim
country.
We wanted to get Arab participation not just rhetorical participation but
concrete participation and we did with the (INAUDIBLE) from the UAE and
the Jordanians and we have had a good legal basis. And we tried to put
together a coalition ....
[President Obama made] a decision to go forward and take out all the air
defense systems in Libya and to make it appropriate then for a "no fly zone"
to be put in place and for operations to begin to protect civilians. And that's
what we did.2 79
In October, as the rebels closed in on Col. Gaddafi's hometown of
Sirte, LNTC forces captured him and his son Muatassim and probably exe-
cuted them while in custody, although crossfire was also blamed.28 0 In
Sirte, "53 bodies of apparent Gaddafi supporters" turned up in a rebel
camp, some apparently executed with their hands tied behind their
backs.2 8 1 By 2012, estimates of the death toll in Libya ranged up to
50,000, as regime loyalists and diverse militias waged ethnic and political
violence.2 8 2
Jihadism emerged fairly early on in the Libyan civil war as a major
factor. As Jon Lee Anderson reported from Libya in May of 2011:
One common myth held that Qaddafi himself was an Israeli agent, part of a
conspiracy backed by the West. Graffiti around the Benghazi courthouse
read "Qaddafi = Yahud." I was told repeatedly that an Israeli woman had
claimed on television that she was a cousin of Qaddafi; the footage had been
rebroadcast on one of the Arabic satellite news channels, and "everyone" had
seen it.
A brigade of former jihadi fighters-tough-looking, full-bearded older men-
had come to the front from the eastern city of Derna. Their leader, Abdel
Hakim al-Hasidi, had fought alongside Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda volun-
teers in Afghanistan, and some of his fighters were jihadi veterans of the war
in Iraq. Another top commander, Abu Sufian bin Qumu, is a former Guanta-
namo detainee who also fought in Afghanistan. 28 3
By 2012, the head of the LNTC Military Council for Tripoli was a
prominent Al-Qaeda veteran.2 8 4
Libya would represent a huge victory for Al-Qaeda if it were able to
displace the other political, tribal, and religious leaders jockeying for power
in the post-Gaddafi era. As the Special Representative of the U.N. Secre-
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tary-General for Libya noted in October 2011, Libya contains an "extraordi-
nary quantity of weaponry and munitions" that now menace not only
Libya's residents but the entire region, because the flow of weapons and
former soldiers "across borders is naturally a major anxiety for Libya's
neighbours and beyond."28 5 Libya's arsenals included chemical weapons,
nuclear materials, "other nonconventional weapons," "all sorts of mines,"
and "the largest known stockpile of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles"
outside of the main arms-exporting countries. 286 Neighboring countries
reported a flood of armaments. In the absence of a central government,
Libya was fast becoming "a haven for violent militant Islam, weapons smug-
gling and the drugs trade right on Europe's doorstep."287
Thousands of lives may be at risk in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad as Al-
Qaeda's North African wing and the Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram, gain
access to huge stockpiles of Libyan machine guns, grenades, and vehicle-
mounted cannons.288 Boko Haram is capable of large-scale attacks on
Christians and secularists, having slain more than 500 in Nigeria in 2011,
250 inJanuary 2012, and dozens more in April of 2012.289 in Mali, Taureg
rebels and allied jihadists conquered territory as large as France, perpetrat-
ing mass rapes and plundering civilian property, which caused 284,000
people to flee the area. 290
In January of 2012, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan visited
Libya to congratulate the rebels on overthrowing the socialist regime and
offered to build a national army based on the rebellion's various compo-
nents.291 He blamed Libya for providing arms to Sudanese rebels who
nearly overthrew his regime in 2008.292 He called the Libyan revolution
"the best gift to Sudan in its modern history."293 Speaking at a press con-
ference with al-Bashir, 294 Mustafa Abdel Jalil, the head of the LTNC, said
that Libya would make major investments in Sudan with the $65-billion
285. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6693d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6639 (Oct. 26, 2011).
286. Id.
287. Hadeel Al Shalchi, Cradle of Libya Revolt Seeks Autonomy from New Rulers,
REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/libya-
autonomy-idUSL6E8F4BTO20120416.
288. Louis Charbonneau, Arms From Libya Could Reach Boko Haram, al Qaeda: U.N.,
REuTERs (Jan. 26, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-
libya-un-arms-idUSTRE80PlQS20120126.
289. See id.; Drew Hinshaw, North Mali Gripped by Rape and Theft, Group Says, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230486800457
7375852099193584.html?mod-googlenews wsj.
290. Hinshaw, supra note 289.
291. Mahmoud Habboush, Sudan's Bashir Offers to Help Form New Libyan Army,
REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/07/us-libya-sudan-id
USTRE806OKL20120107.
292. Sudan: Bashir Criticises Kadhafi in Libya Trip, ALLAFuCA.COM (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201201080036.html.
293. Bashir Hails Gaddafi Fall As 'Best Gift' to Sudan, ALARAB (Aug. 1, 2012), http://
www.alarab.co.uk/english/display.asp?fname=%5C2012%5C01%5C01-08%5Czsubz%
5C910.htm.
294. See id.
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Libyan Investment Authority.295
VI. The Sideshow: Sudan
Many commentators have questioned whether the intervention in
Libya presented a double standard with other countries, such as Syria or
Yemen, where as many, if not more, protesters were killed.2 9 6 But the most
glaring double standard applies to one Arab League member compared
with the others: Sudan. The leaders of Egypt, Libya, and Syria were quickly
asked or forced to step down after killing too many Arabs, often because
other Arab countries opposed their leaders; 297 however, the leader of
Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, has not been asked to step down 298 and
enjoys a thriving trade with the West,299 despite far more victims among
non-Arab populations there. This is because Arab nations, including Saudi
Arabia, support him.300 President Obama called on President Mubarak to
step down immediately and signed an order arming the Libyan rebels and
recognizing them, but did not do the same for Sudan.
The case for regime change was much stronger in Sudan than for virtu-
ally any country in the world. There is perhaps no other country where
more than two million persons have been killed by two decades of a
regime's policies301 and where the U.S. Congress and the President could
agree that the regime had committed genocide, not once but twice: first in
295. Libya NTC Says to Review Investments Worldwide, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2012), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/07/libya-investment-idUSL6E8C70DA20120107.
296. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Intervention in Libya, Yes; Intervention in Syria, No:
Deciphering the Obama Administration, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 251 (2011).
297. See, e.g., U.S. Policy on Syria: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Sec'y, Bureau of Near E. Aff.), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/176948.htm; William Wan & William Booth,
United States Recognizes Libyan Rebels As Legitimate Government, WASH. POST (July 15,
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/western-arab-leaders-meet-
in-turkey-on-libyas-future/2011/07/15/gIQAZLbjFl-story.html; Friends of Syria Confer-
ence Recognizes Syrian National Council as Legitimate Representatives of Syrians, XINHUA
NET (Feb. 25, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-02/25/c_131430
461.htm.
298. In 2009, President Obama's envoy to Sudan explained U.S. policy as "engage-
ment with all parties" in Sudan, "negotiations and discussions and dialogue with the
Khartoum Government," and to "work with the Government of Sudan." U.S. Dep't of
State, Special Envoy Gration Briefs on Recent Trip to Sudan (June 17, 2009) (statement of
U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan J. Scott Gration), available at http://ondon.usembassy.gov/
africa012.html; see also, e.g., Mahmoud A. Suleiman, US's Gration Rewards the Genocidal
NCP, SUDAN TRIB. (Aug. 5, 2009), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=im
primable&id article=32040.
299. U.S. trade in goods with Sudan soared to $143 million in 2008, despite a finan-
cial crisis and recession in the United States. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU FOREIGN TRADE,
2008: TRADE IN GOODS wITH SUDAN (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c7320.html. After declining a bit in 2009, it rose by nearly 50% in 2010.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU FOREIGN TRADE, 2010: TRADE IN GOODS WiTH SUDAN (2011), avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c7320.html.
300. See Sudan, Saudi Summit to Strengthen Political; Economic Ties, SUDAN VISION
(Mar. 10, 2012), http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=207725.
301. See TRAVIs, supra note 9, at 448-54, 463, 470.
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Southern Sudan and then in Darfur.302 Moreover, the Sudanese rebels
were a lot closer to taking the capital of Khartoum in 2008 than the Libyan
rebels were to occupying Tripoli in 2011, when President Obama and the
European and Arab powers began backing the Libyan revolt.303 If genocide
and crimes against humanity are to be taken seriously as justifications for
U.S. military and diplomatic actions, the duty to prevent and punish these
crimes must be fulfilled for non-Arab peoples as well. Even as President
Obama heralded his own protection of civilians in Libya at the 2012 State
of the Union address, violence in largely non-Arab southern Sudan had
driven tens of thousands of civilians from their homes who faced starva-
tion and disease as refugees or internally displaced persons. 304 In 2011,
half a million people were at risk of starvation in southern Sudan (just
north of South Sudan), and threats by Sudan against South Sudan and the
blockade of South Sudan put 4.7 million lives at risk.305
As shown in Tables 1-4, it is not as if, despite its many crimes, the al-
Bashir regime has achieved high levels of economic and human develop-
ment for the majority of its residents. Nor has the regime's continuance in
power stabilized its neighbors, for Sudan has invaded Chad and backed the
incredibly brutal and merciless Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.306
Sudan also persecutes the opposition, the alleged basis of the ICC's crimes
against humanity charges. 307
302. Sudan Peace Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-245, § 2(10), 116 Stat. 1504, 1505
(2002).
303. Compare Sudanese Rebels 'Reach Khartoum', BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/7394033.stm (last updated May 10, 2008), with Gunfire, Explosions Heard in
Tripoli, CNN (Mar. 20, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/19/
libya.civil.war/index.html.
304. See Hannibal Travis & Samuel Totten, Action Needed Now to Avert Famine in Nuba
Mountains, S. SUDAN NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.southsudannewsagency.
com/opinion/columnists/action-needed-now-to-avert-famine-in-nuba-mountains.
305. Half a Million People Risk Starvation in Sudan, VOICE Am. NEWS, http://www.
voanews.com/content/half-a-million-people-risk-starvation-in-sudans-southern-kordo-
fan-and-blue-nile-states-149239585/370059.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2012); U.N.
Mission in S. Sudan, Hunger Could Threaten Over Four Million in South Sudan (Feb. 8,
2012), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:VJsl5qXyr3g:unmiss.
unmissions.org/Default.aspx%3Ftabid%3D3481%26ctl%3DDetails%26mid%3D6047%
261temlD%3D52935%261anguage%3Den-US+sudan+%22four+million%22+hunger+
2012&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
306. See TRAvis, supra note 9, at 462-63; see also JIMMy CARTER, BEYOND THE WHITE
HOUSE: WAGING PEACE, FIGHTING DISEASE, BUILDING HOPE 55 (2007); PETER EICHSTAEDT,
FIRST KILL YOUR FAMILY: CHILD SOLDIERS OF UGANDA AND THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARmy xix,
9 (2009); ERROL P. MENDES, PEACE AND JUSTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COURT OF LAST RESORT 65 (2010). The State Department blamed the Lord's Resistance
Army for large-scale massacres and the displacement of 400,000 of al-Bashir's enemies
in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South
Sudan. See Jonnie Carson, Assistant Sec'y, Bureau of African Aff., Remarks to United
States Institute of Peace: U.S. Efforts to Counter the Lord's Resistance Army (Dec. 17,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2011/178501.htm.
307. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES SUDAN, available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/160477.pdf.
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VII. Wargaming the Arab Spring and Planning U.N. Responses
A. The Duty to Prevent and Punish Genocide
1. Predicting Whether There is a Risk of Genocide in Arab-Spring
Countries
The Arab Spring combines several risk factors for genocide in one
giant political earthquake. As the Cohen-Albright Genocide Prevention
Task Force found in 2008, the risk factors associated with increased risk of
genocide or mass atrocities since 1945 include the following:
* History of genocide or mass atrocities;
* Armed conflict;
* State-led discrimination;
* Exclusionary ideology;
* Ethnically polarized elite;
- Nonviolent protest;
* Leadership instability;
* Autocratic regime;
* High infant mortality; and
* Low trade openness, or non-member of General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade or World Trade Organization 30 8
States' internal repression of the Arab Spring threatened to bring about
cases of auto-genocide, or the killings of a significant part of a national
group by that nation's de jure leadership in order to forestall regime
change. There were precedents for regarding this sort of political killing, or
"politicide," as a prohibited form of genocide, despite the Soviet Union's
insistence in 1948 that "political groups" not be included in the protection
of the U.N. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. 309
The particular warning signs of genocide have surfaced in some Arab
Spring countries. These warning signs include: civil war, which regimes
use to scapegoat local populations and justify massacres; formation of
308. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT & WILLIAM S. COHEN, GENOCIDE PREVENTION TASK FORCE,
PREVENTING GENOCIDE: A BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS 24-25 (2008), available at
http://www.ushmm.org/genocide/taskforce/pdf/report.pdf (citing Barbara Harff, No
Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder
Since 1955, 97 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 57 (2003)).
309. See, e.g., Daniel Feierstein, National Security Doctrine in Latin America: The
Genocide Question, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF GENOCIDE STUDIES 500 (Donald Blox-
ham & A. Dirk Moses eds., 2010); JOHN B. QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN
INTERNATIONAL LAw ANALYSIS 17, 28, 31, 39-41, 164 (2006); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENO-
CIDE IN INTERNATIONAL L.Aw: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 153-65 (2d ed., 2009); Econ. & Soc.
Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, 38th Sess., Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16 (July 2,
1985) (by B. Whitaker).
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clandestine death squads and terrorist cells, which operate in secret and
conceal their doings; demonization of groups and institutionalized inequal-
ity between groups; upcoming elections and intensification of the competi-
tion among groups for political and economic power, including land;
undue concentration of political power; censorship of the media and
absence of freedom of religion or speech; associations of ethnic and relig-
ious groups with political opinions or movements; celebration of past geno-
cides or abuses against an ethnic or religious group; torture, abduction,
rape, and denial of food or water; and redirection of humanitarian aid.310
Crimes against humanity have occurred in new Arab Spring regimes
that arguably owe their existence to other countries. Concerning murder
as the crime against humanity, in October 2011, the Egyptian army and
allied Muslim militias attacked and killed twenty-seven Coptic Christians
in central Cairo. 311 The Copts were actually protesting a failure to investi-
gate or punish the perpetrators of a church massacre, which some believe
helped spark the Egyptian revolution. 312 The ICC condemned smaller-
scale killings of groups of protesters in Libya as crimes against humanity,
as noted above, without taking action on the massacres in Egypt. Concern-
ing persecution as a crime against humanity, an Egyptian student was
arrested and two days of anti-Christian rioting occurred after a dispute
over a Facebook posting in December 2011.313 Other Copts have been
killed for failing to pay protection money to armed militias.314 The ICC, as
described above, attached some importance to the targeting of individuals
based on the content of Facebook postings and to the censorship of such
media by a regime insistent on implementing Islamic law. As relevant to
both Egypt and Libya, Al-Qaeda emerged in North Africa at the intersection
between Arab Nationalism (as a form of anti-imperialist opposition to the
1991 war between Iraq and the U.N.-backed NATO democracies and Arab
monarchies) and jihadism (coupling pan-Islamism with opposition to
modernity, socialism, feminism, and religious toleration).315 Mass exter-
310. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation
of the Five Point Action Plan and the Activities of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/84 (Mar. 9, 2006); Helen Fein, The Three P's
of Genocide Prevention: With Application to a Genocide Foretold- Rwanda, in PROTECTION
AGAINST GENOCIDE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE? 41, 52-53 (Neal Riemer ed., 2000).
311. See Dorell & Lynch, supra note 159; Egypt Islamists Vow to Protect Churches on
Orthodox Christmas, MONSTERS & CRTCS (Dec. 30, 2011, 2:19 PM), http://news.mon-
stersandcritics.com/middleeast/news/article_1683306.php/Egypt-Islamists-vow-to-pro-
tect-churches-on-Orthodox-Christmas.
312. See Leila Fadel, In Mina's Death, Some See Spark for a Second Revolution, WASH.
POST. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-17/world/35280713
1_military-rule-egyptians-heba-morayef
313. See Maggie Michael, Egypt Arrests Christian Over Anti-Prophet Posting, YAHOO!
NEWS (Dec. 31, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/egypt-arrests-christian-over-anti-prophet-
posting-142033787.html.
314. Mary Abdelmassih, Two Copts Killed in Egypt for Refusing to Pay Extortion Money,
ASSYRIAN INT'L NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 26, 2012, 11:36 PM), http://www.aina.org/news/
20120126173659.htm.
315. See Al-Qaeda International: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and
Terrorism, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of J. T. Caruso,
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mination of non-Arabs and Shi'a Muslims is a hallmark of Al-Qaeda and its
past or present state sponsors, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Sudan.3 16 As noted above, an Al-Qaeda veteran became the military leader
of Tripoli after the death of Gaddafi, and reprisals against former regime
figures in Iraq prompted Arab Nationalists and jihadists to cooperate.317
The Arab Spring could therefore promote two exclusionary ideologies: jiha-
dism and Arab Nationalism.
The situation of non-Arabs in Libya continued to deteriorate during
the NATO intervention, constituting mass racial lynching, and perhaps a
successful genocide, by the rebel forces. As the LNTC won the battle for
Western Libya in August, "local militias arbitrarily arrested hundreds, if
not thousands, more sub-Saharan migrant workers and dark-skinned Liby-
ans from the south, accusing them of being mercenaries. In some cases,
the militias subjected these detainees to physical abuse and forced labor in
detention."318 Thousands of non-Arab Africans struggled to survive "in
makeshift camps with very poor living conditions and security."3 19 This
followed the pattern in the east, where reports of dark-skinned people
being hunted down and killed first began to surface. Witnesses described
the systematic persecution and massacres of non-Arab workers and
migrants. As NPR's correspondent reported from Benghazi in February:
Among those desperate to flee the troubles in Libya are thousands of African
migrants from all over the continent.
As NPR's Ofeibea Quist-Arcton reports, they say they've become targets for
Libyans who are enraged that African mercenaries are fighting on behalf of
the regime.
OFEIBEA QUIST-ARCTON: . . . Samuel, who's from Ghana, told the BBC he's
frightened. Samuel is in Benghazi, Libya's second city, which is in the hands
of anti-Gadhafi supporters. But it's these Libyans the Ghanaian and other
Africans fear.
Mr. SAMUEL: Holy God, holy God, holy God. For five weeks now I'm
indoors. Everybody's panic, we need help. We need help. Please, we need
help. They do not like the blacks, so, please, we need your help.
QUIST-ARCTON: The hostility Samuel describes stems directly from reports
that Moammar Gadhafi has mercenary recruits in his security forces from
Africa who are indiscriminately killing protesters. Saad Jabbar, deputy
director of the North Africa Center at Cambridge University, is monitoring
developments in Libya and confirms Africans have become targets.
Professor SAAD JABBAR (Deputy Director, North Africa Center at Cam-
bridge University): I tell you, these people, because of their scheme, they will
Acting Assistant Dir., Counter Terrorism Division, FBI), available at http://web.archive.
org/web/20070110035127/http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congressOl/carusol 21801.
htm; CHRIS HEFFELFINGER, TRENDS IN EGYPTIAN SALAFI AcTivisM 8-11 (2007).
316. See TRAVIS, supra note 9, at 440-78, 489-96, 519, 523-29, 532-44.
317. See Dorell & Lynch, supra note 159; The Next Insurgency: Baathists and Salafis
Pool Resources to Fight Iraqi Government, GULF STATES NEWSLETTER, Sept. 17, 2010, http:/
/www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4cb5e0af99213.pdf.
318. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 276, at 4.
319. Id.
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be slaughtered in Libya. There is so much anger there against those merce-
naries, which suddenly sprung up. I think it is urgent to do something about
it now, otherwise, a genocide against anyone who has black skin and who
doesn't speak perfect Arabic.
QUIST-ARCTON: This Turkish oil worker, who's managed to escape from
Libya, told the BBC he'd witnessed violence against his African colleagues.
Unidentified Man: (Through translator) We left behind our friends from
Chad. We left behind their bodies. We had 70 or 80 people from Chad work-
ing for our company. They cut them dead with pruning shears and axes,
attacking them, saying you're providing troops for Gadhafi. The Sudanese,
the Chadians were massacred. We saw it ourselves.320
At one school serving as a shelter for African refugees, evidence
emerged of anti-black extermination:
Many of the West African workers got caught in the cross fire; some were
mugged or attacked while making their escape from nearby towns, as oppo-
sition protesters accused them of working for the regime. Rashid Mohamed
and about 40 Ghanaian colleagues hid . .. for eight days, rationing bread as
fighting raged around them, with their sleeping quarters-along with their
passports and belongings-burned. "They said that Gaddafi brought the
black people to fight," he says. "So the Libyans, when they see the blacks,
they will kill them."
Residents accuse them of being mercenaries for Gaddafi. "And if they go
out, some people might kill them."3 2 '
Non-Arab Africans told reporters that "the Libyans who oppose Colo-
nel Qaddafi lash out at the African migrants because they look like the
dark-skinned mercenaries many here say the Libyan leader has recruited to
crush the uprising," and that if the rebels "see black people they beat
them," one being beaten so badly in Zawiyah that he could no longer
walk.3 2 2 Others were trapped, fearing abuse.32 3 In one camp, non-Arabs
reported that rebels "chased us with guns and knives" and tortured Afri-
cans with electrical cables, leaving their backs striped with wounds from
being whipped.3 2 4 During the summer of 2011, anti-government forces
conquered Tawergha and then looted it, "leaving a ghost town behind."3 2 5
320. All Things Considered: In Libya, African Migrants Say They Face Hostility, Nat'l
Pub. Radio (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/02/25/134065767/-
African-Migrants-Say-They-Face-Hostility-From-Libyans.
321. Abigail Hauslohner, Lost in Libya's Turmoil: Workers From the Third World, TIME
MAG. (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2055709,00.
html.
322. David D. Kirkpatrick & Scott Sayare, Libyan War Traps Poor Immigrants at Trip-
oli's Edge, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/world/mid-
dleeast/08refugees.html?pagewanted=all&._r=O.
323. See id.
324. Brian Rohan, Displaced Black Libyans Tell of Beatings, Expulsion at Gunpoint,
REuTERs (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/17/us-
libya-displaced-idUSTRE79G2CY20111017.
325. Id.
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As one witness reported, the rebels "came to kill black people .... "326
Reuters reported that the rebel reprisals formed "one of the bloodiest epi-
sodes in Libya's civil war."3 27 A columnist for Modern Ghana wrote mov-
ingly of the plight of these non-Arabs in Libya and of the failure of the
international community to take action on the issue: "We are demanding a
special meeting of United Nation[s] to discuss the elimination of Africans
by lynching in Libya. If it was any other group, the world will be crying
genocide."3 28
Upon learning of U.S. proposals that non-Arab Africans flee for the
borders with Tunisia or Egypt to receive U.S. aid, Gregory Stanton of Geno-
cide Watch was reminded of the Clinton administration's plan to persuade
the Tutsis in Rwanda to depart for safe havens outside Rwanda in order to
receive U.S. assistance.329  Minority Rights Group documented that
"reports of organized racist attacks on so-called 'Black' Libyans and foreign
workers, particularly in rebel-held areas," contributing to the flight of
500,000 from the country, indicated a risk factor for mass killing.330
Although Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq continued to be at the
highest risk of genocide, the Arab Spring had greatly increased the risk for
groups in Libya and Yemen and also increased the risk in Kosovo and
Uganda.33 1
The "attacks on Coptic Christians in Cairo" raised "the specter of Iraq,
where Christians fled persecution in the chaos following the U.S.-led inva-
sion .... 332 Christian Solidarity International announced a new cam-
paign relating to church bombings, mass displacements, and other
evidence of religious genocide in the Middle East and Africa.3 3 3 Laws
prohibiting criticism of the established religion are very common in funda-
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Farouk Martins Aresa, World and Press Watch as Africans Are Lynched in Libya,
MODERN GHANA (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.modernghana.com/news/318508/1/world-
and-press-watch-as-africans-are-lynched-in-l.html. The author elaborated:
The whole world is watching, the whole world is watching, the whole world is
watching as innocent Africans are being lynched in Libya. The time to act is
right now since nobody acted yesterday or day before . . . . There are men,
women and children dying in the hands of Libyan mobs simply because they
look Africans [sic] and must therefore be mercenaries because they cannot place
their hands on Gadhafi. . . . There is no mention of it at the United Nations by
African leaders and countries getting first hand reports are silent.
Id.
329. E-mail from Gregory Stanton, President, Genocide Watch, to author (Feb. 28,
2011) (on file with author).
330. MARK LATTIMER, PEOPLES UNDER THREAT 2011 3-4 (2011), available at http://
www.genocidewatch.org/images/AtRisk_11_MinorityRightsGroupRiskBriefing.
pdf.
331. See id. at 2, 5.
332. Syria's Religious Minorities Wary of Uprising, VOICE AM. NEWS, http://www.
voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Syrias-Religious-Minorities-Wary-of-Uprising-
137497628.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2012, 7:00 PM).
333. See Genocide Alert: Urge President Barack Obama to Defend Middle East Chris-
tians!, CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY INT'L (2012), http://campaigns.csi-usa.org/index.php?id=1
Obama.
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mentalist countries, as they were in various European empires and modern
nation-states before that. Some countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, have gone so far as prohibiting religious
worship that conflicts with Islamic law.3 34
2. Planning U.N. Responses to Attempts or Conspiracies to Commit
Genocide
Although the threat of post-Arab Spring genocides arises from both
regimes and opposition political and religious movements, U.N. responses
have, for the most part, focused only on one or two regimes. The inade-
quacy and partiality of these responses may be in line with Saudi and other
Gulf Arab states' long-term agenda to promote Wahhabi and neo-Wahhabi
modes of governance,335 but the acquiescence of the United Nations in this
strategy will spell disaster for the secular and Christian communities of the
region.
Impunity for genocide and other international crimes is a signature
characteristic of the post-1948 international order. In 1948, the Nurem-
berg tribunal for German war criminals was disbanded.33 6 In the ensuing
six decades, international crimes have multiplied. Although Raphael
Lemkin lobbied in the 1940s for an international criminal court to prevent
and punish genocide, no such court was established until the 2000s. Fur-
thermore, the court that was established in 2002 contained an absurdly
broad "complementarity" loophole that has considerably slowed the pro-
cess of cases to judgment, and states have not cooperated with the court in
any event.33 7 Most individual nations have not vigorously prosecuted the
334. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
2002 523-31, 557-66, 569-71, 579-85, 596-99 (2002).
335. "Neo-Wahhabism" is defined as the jihadist ideology of "Osama bin Laden,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," an ideology that is dedicated to annihi-
lating non-Muslims as a spiritual collectivity, including Shi'a Arabs. HAMID DABASHI,
IsLAMIc LIBERATION THEOLOGY: RESISTING THE EMPIRE 18 (2008); see Daniel Mabrey,
Demystifying Hawala: Understanding Terrorist Financing Networks, 19 CRIME &JUST. INT'L
23, 23 (2003).
336. 1 JULES DESCHENES, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (OF CANADA] ON WAR CRIMINALS 27
(1986).
337. See Jennifer S. Easterday, Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case
Study, 26 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 107 (2009) (suggesting that under the ICC's
"complementarity" loophole, "it is possible for states to prosecute criminals on reduced
domestic charges and apply minimal criminal sanctions, or even grant pardons. For
example, prosecuting a case where all of the elements for genocide were met as a simple
case of multiple murders, even with minimum sentencing, would be considered final
under the Rome Statute."); Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggres-
sion, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 281, 287, 290 (2009) (arguing that the failure of the
Rome Statute of the ICC to "punish aggression is a repudiation of Nuremberg and a step
backward in the development of international criminal law," that "[pirohibiting the ICC
from exercising its jurisdiction is an indefinite guarantee of continuing immunity for
future aggressors," and that the "result is self-defeating and counter-productive" to the
goals of the ICC); William A. Schabas, "Complementarity in Practice": Some Uncompli-
mentary Thoughts, 19 CRIM. L.F. 5, 24 (2008) (criticizing ICC's complementarity analy-
sis as "simplistic" as it treats some non-lethal crimes as worse than homicide or even
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perpetrators of genocide and war crimes in their midst.3 38 Notably, the
United States grants broad immunity to heads of state and other officials
committing war crimes abroad, while not hesitating to arrest, search, and
imprison members of minority black, Native American, and Latino popula-
tions, often for petty, nonviolent crimes such as drug possession.339
There are exceptions to the pattern of post-1948 impunity relating to
countries such as Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia,
Iraq, Sudan, and Lebanon.340 Typically, however, the exceptions simply
prove the rule. For example, U.N. interventions in Iraq and Yugoslavia dur-
ing the early 1990s aimed at minimizing civilian harm, but state fragility
and internal conflict in those countries claimed hundreds of thousands of
lives, with few torturers or perpetrators of religious cleansing held account-
able by the U.N. or anyone else.
Commentators directed severe criticism at President Obama's policies
of seeking peace with favored nations in the Middle East and Africa at the
high price of impunity for notorious and heinous crimes. Much of this
criticism relates to Sudan, for, as Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal
argues, as a political candidate President Obama urged the kind of "tough"
U.N. sanctions on Sudan that he has reserved for Libya, Syria, and Iran,
but once in office his administration offered Sudan a tempting "'menu of
incentives and disincentives"' that Omar al-Bashir could munch on at his
leisure "till he dies comfortably in his bed."341 As the Voice of America
reported, some African Americans lost hope in President Obama as the
massacres, leading to just the sort of "apathy or a desire to protect perpetrators" that ICC
is intended to "fight").
338. Natalie Pierce, Picking Up the Pieces: Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone, 6 N.Z. J.
PuB. & INT'L L. 117, 117-18 (2008) (noting that there was "nearly half a century of
relative inactivity in international criminal law after the International Military Tribunals
in Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II").
339. See David Scheffer, Closing the Impunity Gap in U.S. Law, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L Hum.
RTs. 30, *6, *9, *40 (2009); Mark A. Summers, Immunity or Impunity? The Potential Effect
of Prosecutions of State Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United
States That Are Not Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 463, 470 n.41 (2006). On U.S. incarceration policy as trending towards a racist
"new Jim Crow" model, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JiM CROW: MASS INCARCERA-
TION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, SENTENCING
PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION By RACE AND ETHNICITY 1-2
(2007), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publciations/rd-stateratesof
incbyraceandethnicity.pdf; Joseph Winter, Prison and Native Spirituality, in 1 AMERICAN
INDIAN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 774, 777 (Suzanne J. Crawford & Dennis
F. Kelley eds., 2005); James Forman, Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 22-23 (2012); More Blacks, Latinos in Jail Than
College Dorms, MSNBC, (Sept. 27, 2007, 10:52 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
21001543/ns/usnews-life/more-blacks-latinos-jail-college-dorms/; Ruth Steinberger,
Indian Children Incarceration Rate 40% Higher Than Whites, LAxOTA J., July 26-Aug. 2,
2002, available at http://www.dlncoalition.org/dlnissues/indian-childrenincarcera
tionratehigher.htm.
340. See generally DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2012).
341. Bret Stephens, Does Obama Believe in Human Rights?, WALL ST.J. (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?qcache:KHFdQ-xdOfYJ:online.wsj.
com/article/SB40001424052748704500604574481341183751038.html.
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death toll in the Democratic Republic of Congo surpassed five million, pos-
sibly reached seven million, and prompted the United Nations to issue a
report on genocidal massacres there.342 In 2012, the Obama administra-
tion's decision to admit Yemen's president to the United States for medical
treatment prompted debate about whether the benefits of the plan for
ensuring a peaceful transition in Yemen outweighed the costs of harboring
a leader who allegedly killed hundreds of rebels and protesters and pro-
voked resentment of a type perhaps not seen since the U.S. admission of
the Shah of Iran in 1979.343
In Sudan, of course, despite U.S. and U.N. knowledge of an anti-"infi-
del" genocide since 2004,344 little has been done to remove President al-
Bashir from power, and he continues to tour the region with impunity.34 5
Although an arrest warrant has been issued, NATO members continue to
trade with al-Bashir and to offer him "incentives." 34 6 Indeed, Goldman
Sachs arranged the initial public offering of a key investor in Sudan.347
There are officials in the United States tasked with preventing geno-
cide. On February 24, 2011, Genocide Watch sent a letter to U.S. Ambas-
sador to the U.N. Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz, State
Department Policy Planning Officer Catherine Powell, and U.S. Special
Ambassador for War Crimes Issues Stephen Rapp, asking the United States
to back a U.N. Security Council resolution referring the situation in Libya
342. See Nico Colombant, Africa Policy Watchers Lose Hope in President Obama, VOICE
AM., http://t.co/DDQM5KxB (last updated Jan. 27, 2012, 7:00 PM) ("Congolese Ameri-
cans at [a] recent protest said they had campaigned vigorously for Obama in 2008 and
even rallied for his health care legislation, but that now they felt disillusioned with the
way the U.S. government was dealing with Africa and Africans."); Michelle Faul, A Sec-
ond Rwanda Genocide Is Revealed in Congo, MSNBC (Oct. 10, 2010, 12:25 PM), http://
t.co/tSeGGMui (noting that the many "mass graves" in the Democratic Republic of
Congo prompted "a controversial U.N. report published on Oct. 1, which accuses invad-
ing Rwandan troops of killing tens of thousands of Hutus in 1996 and 1997"); Jennifer
Fierberg, The Nightmare in the Congo, SALEM-NEws.coM (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.
salem-news.com/articles/january242012/congo-violence-jf.php ("Since 1996 the Congo
has been invaded by Rwanda and Uganda for their minerals[,] ... six million Congolese
civilians have been massacred with the full knowledge of the US, UK, Britain and other
western backers which are allowing rebel groups from neighboring countries to kill with
impunity."); Ann Garrison, Congo: What's Rwanda Got to Do with It?, S.F. BAY VIEw (Dec.
27, 2011), http://bit.ly/woVLAO ("Congo's North and South Kivu provinces! ] [are]
intense conflict regions on the country's borders with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.");
Top 25 Censored Stories for 2005-06, PROJECT CENSORED (Sept. 9, 2006), http://
lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/margins-to-centre/2006-September/000966.html (listing
"High-Tech Genocide in Congo" as "[tihe world's most neglected emergency").
343. See Tom A. Peter, Yemen's President Saleh Departs for US, Apparently Ending His
Rule, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terror-
ism-security/2012/0123/Yemen-s-President-Saleh-departs-for-US-apparently-ending-his-
rule.
344. See TRAvIS, supra note 9, at 458-68, 472-73, 555-61.
345. See U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT ON HuMAN RIGHTS
2009 65 (2010); Sudan's Bashir Offers Help to Libya During Criticised Visit, BBC (Jan. 7,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16454493.
346. TRAVIS, supra note 9, at 561; see also Stephens, supra note 341.
347. See As Goldman Exec, Obama Nominee Played Key Role in Sudan-Linked IPO, PuB.
ACCOUNTABILITY INTIATIVE (July 21, 2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/17549361/As-
Goldman-exec-Obama-nominee-played-key-role-in-Sudanlinked-IPO.
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to the ICC.34 8 This presented a complex legal question. Genocide Watch
urged that Resolution 1593 be "adapted and applied to Libya." U.N. Secur-
ity Council Resolution 1593 of March 31, 2005 attempted to make citizens
of states that had not signed and ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC
immune from the ICC's jurisdiction relating to "operations in Sudan estab-
lished or authorized by the Council or the African Union."34 9 The resolu-
tion, controversially, claimed to be "recognizing that States not party to the
Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute,"35 0 while simultane-
ously referring the situation in Sudan to the ICC, resulting in an arrest
warrant against Sudan's sitting head of state, Omar al-Bashir, for crimes
against humanity and genocide.35 1
On the other hand, Dov Jacobs of Leiden University argued that the
Security Council referral violated international law because "the power
given to the Security Council, by a treaty other than the UN Charter to
effectively make [the Rome Statute of the ICC] binding on a non-State
party is contrary to international law."3 5 2 Due to such problems, he
favored eliminating genocide as an international crime.3 53 The problem
with these arguments is that they disregard the obligation under customary
international law to prevent and punish genocide, which is binding on all
states regardless of their refusal to become parties to the Genocide Conven-
tion or the Rome Statute, as reflected in the Sudan ICC referral and other
rulings.
The U.N. also has special officers tasked with preventing genocide.
The Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide
and the RTP, in this capacity, "have reminded the national authorities in
Libya, as well as in other countries facing large-scale popular protests, that
the heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit pledged to
protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement." 3 54
The ICC, however, has the most authority to deal with genocide out of
any actor short of the Security Council, as it may issue arrest warrants,
subject to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC's review. On March 2, 2011,
the ICC Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, declared that because Security
Council Resolution 1970 (2011) conveyed jurisdiction to the ICC over the
situation in Libya since February 15, 2011, he would open an investigation
348. Letter from Genocide Watch to Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Feb. 24,
2011).
349. S.C. Res. 1593, '1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
350. Dov Jacobs, Libya and the ICC: On the Legality of Any Security Council Referral to
the ICC, SPREADING THE JAM BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011), http://dovjacobs.blogspot.com/20I1/
02/un-security-council-resolution-on-libya.html.
351. See S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 349, ' 6.
352. Jacobs, supra note 350.
353. DovJacobs, Bashir and Genocide in Sudan: Second Time Lucky for the OTP, SPREAD-
ING THE JAM BLOG (uly 13, 2010), http://dovjacobs.blogspot.com/2010/07/bashir-and-
genocide-in-sudan-second.html.
354. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to Security Council Meeting on
Peace and Security in Africa, (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/apps/
news/infocus/sgspeeches/statmentsjfull.asp?statlD=1095.
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to assess whether "there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within
the jurisdiction of the [ICC] has been or is being committed."35 5 It would
be up to the ICC judges to decide whether to issue arrest warrants based
on the evidence.35 6 Perhaps due to inadequate funding, undue meddling
by political actors, or excessively onerous standards of proof, whether self-
imposed by the Prosecutor or imposed from above by the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, there have been inexcusably long delays between the opening of an
ICC investigation and having a final warrant of arrest issued. The delays,
in the Libya case, meant that the main target of the investigation, Muam-
mar Gaddafi, was dead before the ICC could hold a hearing or examine any
witnesses in court. The delays in the Darfur case were as follows: investiga-
tion opened June 2005, application for warrant of arrest filed July 2008,
first warrant of arrest issued against the President of Sudan in March 2009,
and second warrant of arrest issued July 2010.357 It even took five months
from the Appeals Chamber's decision on the first warrant for the Pre-Trial
Chamber I to issue a genocide warrant.358 Some of these crimes date back
to 2003, meaning it could well be fifteen years between the commission of
the crime and trial/sentencing, during which time many of the victims of
the crime and their surviving relatives live or die under the sovereign power
of the alleged perpetrator. There is clearly a case for streamlining the
court's procedures, for doing away with formalities and technicalities, and
for the ICC working harder and setting stricter briefing and investigatory
schedules. Otherwise, the ICC threatens to become nearly useless com-
pared to the ICTR, which convicted the Rwandan politician Jean-Paul
Akayesu within about four to five years from a genocidal massacre,35 9 and
the ICTY, which convicted a Srebrenica massacre defendant within six
years of the event. 360 On that schedule, the Darfur case should have been
over in late 2008, but it had yet to begin even in 2012.361 Likewise, follow-
ing the slow pace of international justice, Gaddafi would not have faced
trial until perhaps 2019.
355. ICC: Prosecutor to Open an Investigation in Libya, Hum. RTs. WATCH (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/03/icc-prosecutor-open-investigation-libya.
356. See id.
357. See ICC Prosecutor Opens Darfur Investigation: Full Cooperation is Needed, HUM.
RTs. FIRST (June 7, 2005), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICCInvestigationsDarfur
7Jun2005.pdf; Situation in Darfur, Sudan, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en
menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/Pages/sit-
uation%20icc-0205.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2012); Timeline: The International Crimi-
nal Court and Sudan, REuTERs (Oct. 19, 2009), www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/19/
us-sudan-darfur-events-timeline-sb-idUSTRE591IRI20091019.
358. Saira Mohamed, The ICC Appeals Chamber Decision on the Warrant of Arrest in
Prosecutor v. Bashir, 14 Am. Soc. INT'L L., Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://www.asil.
org/insightsl00217.cfm.
359. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Sentence (Oct. 2, 1998).
360. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001).
361. See Situation in the Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09-412, Defence
Application for Leave to Appeal the "Decision on the Defense Request for a Temporary
Stay of Proceedings," T 23 (Nov. 5, 2012).
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Those honored with the solemn responsibility to protect humanity
from genocide should live up to the gravity of the task before them.
Bureaucratization, nit-picking, and gilding the lily do a disservice to the
potential victims of genocide who call upon the international community
to save them. The international community's virtual silence in the face of
warning signs of genocide is tantamount to consent. It must urgently
reform international institutions that have repeatedly failed to prevent or
punish cases of genocide in the past, including the ICC, the International
Court of Justice, and the U.N. Security Council. Scholars and journalists
may contribute to this process by recognizing and condemning attempted
genocides and conspiracies to commit genocide; studying and distributing
evidence of the warning signs and preparatory stages to genocide as they
emerge, while there is still time to prevent them; and building a culture of
intolerance to genocide. When countries experience armed conflict, mili-
tias are formed, minorities lack political power, effective protection of
human rights falls by the wayside, minorities are blamed for consorting
with enemies of the majority, religious freedom is at risk, and torture, mur-
der, and abduction reach epidemic proportions, genocide is close at hand.
B. The Duty to Prevent and Punish Other War Crimes
The merit of looking to war crimes other than genocide as sources of
obligations on the part of states, and principles overriding their sover-
eignty, is that other war crimes may be easier to prove than genocide. Long
delays sometimes result from legalistic arguments about whether certain
killings or tortures meet the definition of genocide, while such killings or
tortures may be relatively easy to characterize as war crimes. Unfortu-
nately, U.N. member states typically do not honor the duty to prevent and
punish other war crimes. Such crimes remain distressingly common and
are even publicly defended in places such as the U.S. Congress.
There are precedents, however, for holding foreign governments
responsible for supporting and arming rebel movements, or even duly con-
stituted governments, when the rebels or regimes kill civilians. The Fourth
Geneva Convention of 1949 creates an obligation on the part of most U.N.
member states to try and punish those who, "regardless of their national-
ity," torture, treat cruelly, unlawfully deport, willfully cause great suffering
to, or willfully kill or maim civilians or surrendering soldiers.362 The
ICTY has declared that a state may control forces acting on its behalf even
if such forces "had autonomous choices of means and tactics although par-
ticipating in a common strategy along with the 'controlling State.'" 363 The
Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted the former President of Liberia,
Charles Ghankay Taylor, for having "assisted," "encouraged" or "act[ed] in
concert with" the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, which mur-
dered, raped, and acted cruelly towards an unknown number of civilians in
362. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts.
2-3, 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
363. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 47 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
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Sierra Leone. 364 In the South African apartheid case in the Second Circuit,
the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs could sue corporations who aided
and abetted a violation of the law of nations, with two judges agreeing that
"the individual responsibility of a defendant who aids and abets a violation
of international law" is a universal rule.3 65 In Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro, Judge Al-Khasawneh of the International Court of
Justice emphasized that international tribunals must not insist that those
supporting war crimes control the "specific operations," for that would
"give[ I States the opportunity to carry out criminal policies through non-
state actors or surrogates without incurring direct responsibility there-
for."366 Remarking on this case and on the 2001 Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Amnesty International argued
that if another state supplies or permits the sale of arms that a military or
police force used in the past to fire on and threaten protesters, this may
"knowingly aid or assist another state to commit an internationally wrong-
ful act such as the perpetration of crimes against humanity or human
rights violations by a police force, [in which case] the transferring state
will also be responsible under international law."367 Therefore, it seems
likely that under established principles of state responsibility for the con-
duct of rebels in other states, providing arms or encouragement to rebel
groups even without controlling them may constitute a breach of interna-
tional law, and countries such as Qatar have an obligation to punish lynch-
ings and mass-casualty bombings that rebels or former rebels who seize
control of a region carry out.
The obligation not to facilitate rebel groups that persecute Christians,
Jews, secularists, or non-Arabs also applies to those inside the United
States contemplating actions that could lead to deaths in Africa or Asia. 368
The War Crimes Act makes grave violations of the Geneva Conventions a
U.S. crime, and conspiracies or aiding and abetting may be actionable
under general principles of U.S. law.369 In a related vein, the van Anraat
case in the Netherlands illustrates the potential criminal responsibility of
arms dealers under such a law for selling weapons to states or other groups
motivated by exclusionary ideologies resulting in massacres of ethnic
364. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Judgment, 9 13 (May 18, 2007).
365. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'1 Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2007).
366. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 1.CJ. 256 (2007) (Dissenting
Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh).
367. AMNESTY INT'L, ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: LESSONS
FOR AN EFFECTIVE ARMS TRADE TREATY 6 (2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/
library/asset/ACT30/117/2011/en/049fdeee-66fe-4bl3-a9Oe-6d7773d6a546/
act30117201len.pdf (citing Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
G.A. Res. 56/83, arts. 16, 41(2), U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001)).
368. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32438, U.N. CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 10
(Jan. 25, 2008), available at fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101750.pdf.
369. See id.; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41223, FEDERAL CON-
SPIRACY LAw: A BRIEF OVERVIEw 13 (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R41223.pdf.
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minorities, in that case Kurds under Arab Nationalism.3 70 Perhaps cogni-
zant of that case, the NATO countries have been suppressing evidence of
mass torture and persecution in Iraq, even as they step up military cooper-
ation with and arms sales to Iraq's military.37'
David Scheffer, who was centrally involved with the creation of inter-
national criminal tribunals for Sierra Leone and other countries as the U.S.
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, has argued that new treaties
are needed to hold states accountable for crimes against humanity and war
crimes, which may evade the reach of the ICC, due to its focus on individu-
als, and of the International Court of Justice, due to technical jurisdictional
limitations.3 7 2 Any proposed crimes against humanity treaty should cre-
ate an obligation on the part of ratifying states similar to, or preferably
even more clear than, their obligation under Article I of the Genocide Con-
vention to prevent and punish such crimes. This obligation implies a
responsibility not to facilitate the rise to power of political movements that
will persecute religious minorities or ethnic groups, establish a dominant
religion as the official faith by coercion, or restrict the inherent human
rights to change one's religion, circulate religious ideas, worship and
assemble as one desires at any given point in time, or enjoy full equality
without legal or social discrimination with respect to other ethnicities, reli-
gions or sects.373
C. The Duty Not to Return Refugees to Civil War or Ethno-Political
Violence
Prior to the Arab Spring, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya were not among the
most prolific sources of refugee flight in Africa: that status was reserved for
Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola, each of
which drove away more than ten times as many refugees as the upper tier of
North African countries.374 Syria and Yemen, despite quite serious politi-
cal conditions, also could not come close to Iran or Iraq in terms of refugee
flight.375 Indeed, Syria and Yemen hosted huge numbers of refugees from
370. See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide Under Interna-
tional Law, 6 HARVARD L. & POL'Y REv. 339 (2012); Harmen van der Wilt, Genocide v.
War Crimes in the Van Anraat Appeal, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 557 (2008).
371. CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: SECRET GOVERNMENT, WAR
CRIMES, AND THE RULE OF LAw (2009); Jeffrey Kaye, Iraqi Torture Scandal Touches Highest
Levels of NATO, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.truth-out.org/iraqi-torture-scan-
dal-touches-highest-levels-nato/1325794053#.TwfcygZNXX8.twitter.
372. See David Scheffer, The World Court's Fractured Ruling on Genocide, 2 GENOCIDE
STUD. & PREVENTION 123, 132 (2007).
373. As I have argued elsewhere, religious or political compulsion, when violent and
systematic, should be considered as constituting a crime against humanity, namely per-
secution. See Hannibal Travis, YouTube from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe: Tyrannize Locally,
Censor Globally, in TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE INTERNET AGE 76, 105-06 (Adam
Candeub & Sean A. Pager eds., 2012).
374. See Simon Rogers, Refugee Statistics Mapped, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2011), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/interactive/201 1/jun/20/refugee-statistics-
mapped.
375. See id.
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elsewhere, notably from Iraq and Somalia.376 By the end of 2011, how-
ever, more than 1,500 people from Africa and Asia had died at sea en route
to Europe, and it would be difficult to deny that many, if not most of them,
were fleeing political persecution and violence.377 Italy anticipated up to
300,000 refugees from Libya on its shores if the regime fell in February
2011.378 In fact, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees reported that
since February 2011, 660,000 Libyans have fled the country, and 200,000
were internally displaced.37 9 Approximately 90,000 Libyan refugees and
200,000 Libyan residents born in third countries fled to Tunisia, with most
of them returning home after the violence ended.38 0 Tunisia was not pre-
pared to offer asylum to those fearing to return home, because the govern-
ment lacked the judicial capacity to honor its responsibilities under the
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Refugee Protocol.3 8 ' Further,
Amnesty International condemned the international community, espe-
cially the European Union, for failing to fulfill their shared responsibilities
under international law to protect Libyan refugees, concluding that "sub-
Saharan Africans in Libya remain at high risk of abuse and arbitrary arrest
by anti-Gaddafi forces." 382 Egypt and Tunisia, overwhelmed by the Liby-
ans they did allow in, confined others in desert camps, without either dig-
nity or freedom, contrary to the oft-heralded aims of the Arab Spring.383
International law provides a framework for the orderly resolution of
the claims of asylum-seekers from Arab Spring countries and their neigh-
bors that they should not be forcibly deported back "home." Article 3 of
the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment provides that, "[n]o State Party shall expel,
return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture."384 In deciding whether such grounds exist, a state party
should consider whether the state to which the person would be sent is
experiencing "a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
376. See id.; Global Trends Report 2010, UNHCR (2011), https://docs.google.com/
spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AonYZs4MzlZbdEISazg4bEO4MWIFVURmQW10TDVneHc&hl=
enUS#gid=2.
377. See UN Says Record Number of Migrants Die in Mediterranean in 2011, RADIO FREE
EUR. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/unsays-record-numbermigrants
die mediterranean_2011_int_awire/24469347.html.
378. See Nick Squires, Libya: Italy Fears 300,000 Refugees, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8343963/
Libya-Italy-fears-300000-refugees.html.
379. See 2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Libya, UNHCR, http://www.
unhcr.org/pages/49e485f36.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
380. UNHCR, GLOBAL APPEAL 2012-13, TUNISIA 138 (2011), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/4ec2310016.html.
381. See id. at 143.
382. Libya: Totally Inadequate Response by EU States to Refugees Stuch in Limbo,
AMNESTY INT'L (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/
libya-totally-inadequate-response-eu-states-refugees-stuck-limbo-2011-09-19.
383. See id.
384. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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human rights."33 5 Similarly, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees denies states the right to return refugees to climates of persecu-
tion, urging states to give refuge to such unlucky souls without regard to
ethnic or national favoritism and to excuse refugees' failure to pursue legal
immigration procedures due to the threat of persecution or death.386
Although the 1951 Convention was restricted to events occurring in
Europe or Turkey,387 the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of
1967388 extended refugee protection to those suffering persecution in
other lands.389 As stated in the Convention, refugees should not be pun-
ished as a result of "illegal entry or presence" if they "present themselves
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry
or presence."390
D. The Duty to Respect the Political Independence and Territorial
Integrity of Other States
The U.N. Charter purports to regulate the international relations of
U.N. member states. Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter attempts to
restrict the threat or use of force against the "territorial integrity" or "politi-
cal independence" of a member state or other force exercised "in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."39 1 Force
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations includes force pursuant
to Articles 39 and 42 of the U.N. Charter, pursuant to which the Security
Council may authorize member states to act militarily against "any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." 3 9 2 The Security
Council, therefore, is responsible for maintaining international peace and
security.393 Although many U.N. member states have the opportunity to
sit on the Security Council, five nations are permanent members and the
non-permanent members must vie for a spot at biannual intervals, with no
chance for consecutive terms.394 The five permanent member states are
the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
385. Id. art. 3(2).
386. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees arts. 1(A)(2), 33, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention]; Erika Feller, The Evolu-
tion of the International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 129, 131-32
(2001).
387. See SYLVIE DA LOMBA, THE RIGHT TO SEEK REFUGEE STATUS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
3 (2004).
388. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, arts. 1, 33-34, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter 1967 Refugee Protocol].
389. See DA LOMBA, supra note 387, at 3.
390. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 386, art. 31(1).
391. See U.N. Charter, art. 2(4).
392. See id. art. 39 ("[The Security Council] shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security."), art. 42 (Security Council may authorize
action "to maintain or restore international peace and security," including a "blockade,
and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.").
393. See id., art. 24.
394. See Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, Rules 142-44, U.N. Doc. A/
520/Rev.15 (Dec. 31, 1984); U.N. Charter, art. 23.
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land, France, Russia, and China.395 Although Security Council resolutions
pass by a threshold set at a positive vote of nine members, the permanent
member states have veto power to block proposed resolutions of the Secur-
ity Council without justification,3 96 and they often use this power to pro-
tect their own and their allies' interests. 397
In cases such as Libya, the debate concerning the potential infringe-
ment of Libya's territorial integrity and political independence relates pri-
marily to whether the Security Council should have authorized force at all
in order to protect civilians and whether, once it did, it exceeded its man-
date by seeking regime change. In other cases, the Article 2 issues are
murkier and more multi-faceted.
Without a Security Council resolution, some scholars have argued
that a right or even a responsibility of humanitarian intervention devolves
upon regional organizations and those powerful enough to intervene mili-
tarily. The factors underlying the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as
a matter of past state practice supported by diplomats and legal scholars-
and the RTP as endorsed by the Security Council and Secretary-General
since at least 2006-illustrates some differences between Libya and other
cases where intervention has not been forthcoming.398 The customary
international law factors governing the right of humanitarian interven-
tion 399 include the following:
1. The human rights violations must be immediate. This was satisfied in
not only Libya but also in many other countries.
2. The force must be proportionate to the danger. This was the most ques-
tionable criterion in Libya, as the force used may have gone beyond protect-
ing particular civilians, opening a humanitarian corridor, delivering food
and water to areas of conflict, or facilitating the flow of refugees to Europe
and elsewhere in Africa. Attacking government troop formations and lead-
ers related to but arguably transcended these purposes. Other Security
Council resolutions directed at protecting civilians were not followed by
immediate efforts to achieve regime change by bombardment and arming
rebels. One might argue, on the other hand, that steps short of regime
395. Current Members, UN, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2013).
396. Thomas Bruha, Security Council, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAw, POLICIES AND PRAC-
TICE 1147, 1152 (Ruidiger Wolfrum ed., 1995).
397. Id. at 1156-57.
398. S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); Press Release, Impor-
tance of Preventing Conflict Through Development, Democracy Stressed, as Security
Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 1674, U.N. Press Release SC/8710 16 (Apr.
28, 2006), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8710.doc.htm.
399. These factors are drawn from Lillich and Gallant. Seejudy A. Gallant, Humanita-
rian Intervention and Security Council Resolution 688: A Reappraisal in Light of a Chang-
ing World Order, 7 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 881, 890 n.49 (1992); Richard B. Lillich,
Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alterna-
tives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 248 (John N. Moore ed., 1974);
Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL LJ. 205, 218 (1969);
Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV.
325, 347-51 (1968).
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change during U.N.-authorized interventions fell short in Sudan in the
1980s, and Iraq and Somalia in the 1990s, as massive violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law continued to occur after particu-
lar civilians were protected and aid was delivered to war-torn areas.
3. The force must be limited to ongoing or imminent large-scale depriva-
tions of the most fundamental human rights (i.e., the government must
kill, threaten to kill, or act so recklessly as to result in the death of a sub-
stantial number of its own people). This was debatable in Libya, but it
seems that the imminent dangers of human rights violations in various
locations, including Tripoli, could have justified some of the force used.
The former Libyan ambassador has said that without the NATO interven-
tion that occurred, more than 100,000 may have died in Benghazi. Up to
20,000 were killed in a similar battle in 1982 in Syria. More than 100,000
were killed, and tenth of Iraq's population fled analogous fighting in 1991,
and 1,000 refugees died daily by some estimates.400
4. The intervener must be relatively disinterested, but other motives may
be present if not overriding. Other motives might be overpowering in the
case of Iraq or Saudi Arabia due to their market power in world energy
markets, but were less compelling in Libya, which was a much smaller mar-
ket share. Bahrain and other small kingdoms and emirates occupy a mid-
dle category. The United States' and Europe's arms sales to Bahrain and
other Gulf states may be large, but are not enormous in the overall scheme
of the exporting nations' respective economies. Yemen is much poorer
than Libya. One might argue that Libya is well-situated for pro-democratic
intervention in that it is rich enough for the rule of law and liberal institu-
tions potentially to succeed, unlike Yemen. Iraq and Saudi Arabia are so
rich in oil and gas reserves that no intervention there could be disinter-
ested and energy concerns would likely predominate.
5. All peaceful means must be exhausted or futile before intervening with
force. Peaceful means have been pursued Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, and other
cases, but may have been believed to be futile in Libya. Western govern-
ments had been calling on Libya to stop censoring and torturing members
of the political opposition for decades without result. The same could be
said of other African and Middle Eastern states, however.40 1
400. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS TORMENT: THE 1991 UPRISING IN IRAQ AND ITS
AFTERMATH (1992), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1992/lraq926.htm;
1982: Syria's President Hafez al-Assad Crushes Rebellion in Hama, GUARDIAN ARCHIVE
BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/
201 1/aug/01/hama-syria-massacre-1982-archive; Chemical Ali Sentenced to Death for a
Second Time, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2008, 1:24 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/middleeast/iraq/3542055/Chemical-Ali-sentenced-to-death-for-a-second-
time.html; Libyan Envoy Aujali: Gadhafi Has 'No Place to Go', PBS (Mar. 22, 2011), http:/
/www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-junel l/libya2 03-22.html.
401. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/LBY/CO/4 (Nov. 15, 2007); U.S. DEP'T
STATE, CouNTRY REPORT ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2002-LIBYA (2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&amp;docid=
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The RTP principles include the following:
1. "Serious harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to
occur," such as "large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended," as "the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect . . . ."402 The
Security Council and NATO had abundant cause to believe that large-scale
loss of life was "apprehended" in Libya, and perhaps in some other cases as
well. They could cite former Libyan officials, including the former interior
minister and U.N. delegation, for this proposition.
2. "The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives inter-
vening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right
intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported
by regional opinion and the victims concerned."40 3 A multilateral opera-
tion would be less likely to be endorsed by the United Nations or Arab
League in cases of Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Yemen, which are sim-
ilar to other Arab states in their violations of human rights (except for
Saudi Arabia, which is committed to total religious genocide on a continu-
ous basis but is very powerful within the United Nations, the Arab League,
the G20, the United States, etc.). Colombia and Sri Lanka are also coun-
tries that might meet RTP principle #1 but not #2 because their neighbors
support the violence going on there (as with Plan Colombia and Asian
nations' aid to Sri Lanka).
3. "Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military
option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been
explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not
have succeeded." 404 As noted above, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
had called for a peaceful solution in Bahrain and Yemen and condemned
Saudi violence in Bahrain.405 In other places, such as Colombia or Sri
Lanka, there are claims of a "peace process" despite tens of thousands of
deaths in civil war.406
4. "The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention
should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection
3e918c352&amp;skip=0&amp;coi=LBY&amp;querysi=Practices&amp;searchin=title&
amp;display=10&amp;sort=date.
402. INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PRO-
TECT XII (2001).
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See Clinton Calls Intervention in Bahrain 'Alarming', CNN (Mar. 16, 2011), arti-
cles.cnn.com/2011-03-16/us/us.bahrain 1_bahraini-state-hillary-clinton-jay-carney;
Mohammed Jamjoom & Hakim Almasmari, Yemeni Opposition Signs Deal Leading to
President's Departure, CNN (May 21, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
meast/05/21/yemen.political.deal/index.html.
406. Carmen Lomellin, Supporting the Peace Process in Colombia, U.S. DEP'T STATE
BLOG (july 29, 2010), blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/colombia-peaceprocess;
Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State, Sri Lanka: Peace Process (Mar. 14, 2002), http://
2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8774htm; Press Statement, U.S. Dep't of State,
The Peace Process in Sri Lanka (Nov. 19, 2004), http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2004/38513.htm.
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objective." 407 It seems that in Libya, as described above, the primary cri-
tique of the intervention is that it did not last long enough and was not
conducted intensely enough against the rebel factions to secure the objec-
tive of protecting Libyan civilians, including Libyans originating in other
African countries or having darker skin tones.
5. "There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the
suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction."408 There
may not be a reasonable prospect of reducing the level of suffering prevail-
ing in Syria, Yemen, or other countries, given the danger of Al-Qaeda taking
over. The democratic opposition may be weaker, and it may lack needed
support from the army or the country's security agencies or diplomats to
re-establish order and government services in some of the countries other
than Libya.
6. "There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations
Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection
purposes .... Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought
prior to any military intervention action being carried out."4 09 The Secur-
ity Council authorized intervention in Libya, but did not authorize one in
Syria or Yemen in 2011.410
7. "If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a
reasonable time," there are two alternative options: first, "consideration of
the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under
the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure;" and second, "action within area of juris-
diction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter VIII of the
Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Secur-
ity Council."411
The Arab League may lack the resources to intervene effectively in
Syria or Yemen, given that its aircrafts may present less of a dramatic dis-
parity with these nations than NATO's aircrafts present. In addition, there
is another regional organization that might effectively oppose Arab League
interventions in other Arab Spring countries: the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) may eventually have more countries participating in it
than the Arab League and far vaster populations and resources. 412 Nota-
bly, in 2005 the SCO called upon the United States to set a firm deadline
407. INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 402, at XII.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone'
Over Libya, Authorizing, 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 in
Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
411. Id. at XIII
412. SHIRLEY A. KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33001, U.S.-CHINA COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLIcy 30 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/terror/RL33001.pdf (noting that Iran, India, and Pakistan participated as observers
in the SCO between 2005 and 2009, along with core members China, Russia, and Cen-
tral Asian states).
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for withdrawal of its forces from Central Asia.4 13 As noted above, China,
India, and Russia have opposed forceful humanitarian intervention in
Syria, let alone other states.414
8. "The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations
that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shock-
ing situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out
other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation - and that
the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby."4 15
This is a wild card clause in RTP doctrine, suggesting a role for unilateral
action against "conscience-shocking situations,"416 which are ubiquitous
in the world of nation-states dominated by ethnic groups.
9. "Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and
resources to match."417 It is questionable whether clear objectives and ade-
quate resources existed for the Libyan intervention; it is still less clear that
sufficient resources would exist to "protect" 418 Syria or Yemen, when pro-
tection of the civilian population post-intervention is included in the man-
date of the intervention. NATO countries' resources are stretched thin in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia. The Arab League has rarely
engaged in large-scale wars collectively.
10. "Common military approach among involved partners; unity of com-
mand; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command."419
This proved to be problematic, but not entirely absent, in the Libya inter-
vention for which NATO provided a decision-making superstructure. 420
11. "Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the
application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not
defeat of a state."421 This principle seemed to have been violated in Libya,
with defeat of a state being not only aimed at, but also achieved in stun-
ning fashion.
12. "Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise;
reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to inter-
national humanitarian law."422 It is difficult to say whether this principle
was satisfied in Libya, for information about civilian casualties is ambigu-
ous.4 23 Some have forcefully argued that disproportionate weapons were
413. See id.; see also ROBERT SUTTER, HisTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POL-
icy xxxiii (Jon Woronoff ed., 2011).
414. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: SYRIA (2012) available at http:/
/www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-syria.
415. INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 402, at XLII.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. See JIM ZANOTTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41761, TURKEY-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERA-
TION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES 8-9 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
mideast/R41761.pdf.
421. INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 402, at XIII.
422. Id.
423. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 276.
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used in Libya. They might also be used in Syria or Yemen, as they were
used widely in Iraq.4 24
13. "Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objec-
tive."425 This is difficult to assess without better information about rules
of engagement and operational tactics. It is always an issue, however, when
better-equipped forces, especially air forces, take on relatively poorly
equipped third-world armies, as in Iraq, Libya, or Yugoslavia.
14. "Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organiza-
tions."426 In Libya, this does not seem to have occurred; although some
aid was provided, it was far short of "maximum" possible aid.4 27 It is even
more doubtful that such aid would have occurred in Syria or Yemen, given
the logistical problems in those countries.
As argued above, although the Security Council's decision-making
remains highly politicized and arbitrary, to the detriment of human free-
dom and the advancement of human rights, there is another U.N. body that
might promote respect for the territorial integrity and independence of
states, while taking note of the RTP as an emerging doctrine of customary
international law. The U.N. Security Council is only one of six principal
organs that the U.N. Charter created.428 Although the U.N. General
Assembly (General Assembly) elects a majority of members to the Security
Council, it is the permanent member states that possess the greatest
power. According to Article 7 of the U.N. Charter, they may act through
the General Assembly, the International Court of Justice, the Economic
and Social Council, and the Secretariat. The International Court of Justice
is a key Charter institution whose expertise in and mission to promote
international law might have influenced the course of the Arab Spring.42 9
The loopholes in its jurisdiction, which is based on consent and the slow
and old-fashioned nature of its procedures, in addition, prevent the Court
from being brought into play in the cases of Libya or Syria, or even in the
much more long-standing disputes such as Iraq and the Persian Gulf,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, or Somalia and Ethiopia.
One area in which the International Court of Justice might clarify the
law is by articulating the distinction between rebels whom a state aids
without controlling, and whose crimes for which the state is not responsi-
ble because they might have been committed anyway, 430 and rebels who
424. See, e.g., CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR, CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2011 (2011),
available at http://www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2011/pdf/ClusterMunitionMonitor_
201 1.pdf.
425. INT'L COMM. ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 402, at XIII.
426. Id.
427. See UN to Send Aid to Eastern Libya Amid Reports of Hardship and Attacks on
Civilians, UNITED NATIONS NEws CENTRE (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewslD=37851&Cr=1ibya&Crl=.
428. U.N. Charter art. 7, para. 1.
429. See id., art. 38.
430. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27).
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occupy the entire country as a result of another state's material or political
aid, whose crimes the aiding state should be held responsible for as the
sovereign power that has seized control of the nation.43 1 This would
require an in-depth analysis, beyond the scope of this Article, of the princi-
ples of state attribution, state responsibility, and the legal status of exter-
nal support to armed rebels assuming some level of control (such as when
rebels are given funds, as Qatar gave funds to Libyan rebels and Saudi Ara-
bia may have given funds to Syrian rebels, or when rebels have known
bases in a foreign country (like Turkey)). 43 2
E. The Duty to Promote Other Human Rights
Although perhaps not a "duty," the promotion of human rights is a
key objective of the United Nations. In his Cairo speech, President Obama
stated:
Among some Muslims, there is a disturbing tendency to measure one's own
faith by the rejection of another's. The richness of religious diversity must
be upheld - whether it is for Maronites in Lebanon or the Copts in Egypt.
And fault lines must be closed among Muslims as well, as the divisions
between Sunni and Shia have led to tragic violence, particularly in Iraq.
Freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together. We
must always examine the ways in which we protect it.4 3 3
Regarding democracy in the Middle East, he addressed activists, say-
ing that "you must maintain your power through consent, not coercion;
you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of
tolerance and compromise . . .. Without these ingredients, elections alone
do not make true democracy."4 3 4
As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in 2010:
Religious freedom is under threat from authoritarian regimes that abuse
their own citizens. It is under threat from violent extremist groups that
exploit and inflame sectarian tensions. It is under threat from the quiet but
persistent harm caused by intolerance and mistrust which can leave minor-
ity religious groups vulnerable and marginalized.
During the past year, al-Qaida issued calls for further violence against relig-
ious minorities in the Middle East. Sufi, Shia, and Ahmadiyya holy sites in
Pakistan have been attacked. So was a Syriac Catholic church in Baghdad
just a few weeks ago.4 3 5
Nearly one year later, Secretary Clinton noted:
431. Cf. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/
9731 (Vols. I & II), at 142-44 (Dec. 14, 1974), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/
avl/pdf/ha/da/da-ph-e.pdf.
432. Cf. id.
433. Full Text: Barack Obama's Cairo Speech, supra note 8.
434. Id.
435. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Address at the Release of the 2010
International Religious Freedom Report (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/151081.htm.
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[In 2011,] we heard reports that gunmen masquerading as security officers
waylaid a bus of Shia pilgrims traveling throughout western Iraq. The
women were abandoned by the side of the road, but the 22 men were shot,
and their bodies left in the middle of the desert. This sort of hateful, sense-
less violence has no aim other than to undermine the fabric of peaceful
society.
In the Middle East and North Africa, the transitions to democracy have
inspired the world, but they have also exposed ethnic and religious minori-
ties to new dangers. People have been killed by their own neighbors because
of their ethnicity or their faith. In other places, we've seen governments
stand by while sectarian violence, inflamed by religious animosities, tears
communities apart.
Now, the people of the region have taken exciting first steps toward democ-
racy-but if they hope to consolidate their gains, they cannot trade one form
of repression for another.43 6
Secretary Clinton expanded upon these remarks in another speech in
late 2011:
[T]his year, the international community in the Human Rights Council
made an important commitment. And it was really historic, because before
then, we had seen the international community pit against one another free-
dom of religion and freedom of expression. And there were those in the
international community who vigorously and passionately defended one but
not the other. And our goal in the work that so many nations represented
here have been doing, with the adoption of Resolution 1618 and then again
last month in the General Assembly's Third Committee, was to say we all can
do better. And this resolution marks a step forward in creating a safe global
environment for practicing and expressing one's beliefs. In it, we pledge to
protect the freedom of religion for all while also protecting freedom of
expression. And we enshrined our commitment to tolerance and inclusivity
by agreeing to certain concrete steps to combat violence and discrimination
based on religion or belief.43 7
Resolution 1618 may be historic, but it is far from having the robust-
ness required to face the threats of marginalization, vulnerability, discrimi-
nation, intimidation, and violence of which Secretary Clinton spoke.
Rather, it is well-known in the United States and Europe that hate groups
and religious extremists require the deterrent effect of criminal law in order
to dull the edge of their violence and that even with such laws the killing
and marginalization may continue for decades, as the ongoing crimes of
neo-Confederate groups in the United States and neo-Nazi groups in the
United States and Europe demonstrate.
It is possible, indeed likely, that after a full transition away from mili-
tary and emergency rule, quasi-democratic elections in Arab Spring coun-
tries, after the flight of many middle-class secularists and religious
436. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Secy of State, Remarks at the Release of the 13th
Annual Report on International Religious Freedom (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/09/172254.htm.
437. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at the Istanbul Process for
Combating Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Dec. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178866.htm.
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minorities, will be swept by the best-funded and best-organized radical the-
ocratic groups, much as in Iraq and the Gaza Strip in 2005. Even if such
groups cannot immediately claim victory, they will attempt to intimidate
and cause secularists and religious minorities to flee, again as in Iraq and
Gaza, leading to a slow and steady march to power in increasingly fearful,
divided, and impoverished societies. At that point, again as in Iraq and
Gaza, it may be too late for other nations to promote human rights.
It will be a sorry testament to the democratizing power of social media
and the insistence on freedom and dignity of many protesters if the Arab
Spring countries of Egypt, Libya, and Syria come to resemble the surviving,
Arab-majority, authoritarian, quasi-theocratic states of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, and Sudan. If so, refugees may sigh in far-off lands for the secular
culture and oil wealth they used to enjoy.43 8
Conclusion
There are many models for post-authoritarian transitions; some of
them are not very inspiring. For every happy ending like those in Central
Europe, Japan, or South Korea, there may be a story like that of Russia,
Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Colombia, or Mexico: featuring civil
war, rampant crime, massive corruption, and/or plummeting health stan-
dards. The laws of many countries have fallen short when it comes to hold-
ing domestic perpetrators of political and religious violence accountable in
court. Hagiography and whitewash are too often handed down in schools
and by the media. The principal corrective to such propaganda is the even-
handed and objective interpretation and application of international crimi-
nal law and human rights treaties to political and military leaders. Time
will tell if the rise of social media, and President Obama's commitment to
freedom and the cause of peace, will persuade the United Nations to guide
the world towards compliance with its own solemn treaties.
438. In Iraq, half of the population survived on less than one dollar per day in 2007,
as the median household income fell to $144 per month, unemployment approached
60%, food subsidies were slashed, and one in four children suffered from chronic hun-
ger. See U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report,Jan. 1-Mar. 31, 2007,
62 (2007); U.N. DEv. PROGRAMME, IRAQ LIVING CONDITIONS SURVEY 2004, VOLUME 1: TABU-
LATION REPORT (2005), available at cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/english tabulation.pdf;
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 26, at 24, 33; NGO Coordinating Comm. in
Iraq & Oxfam Int'l, Rising to the Humanitarian Challenge in Iraq 3-4, 6, 9, 12, 17-19, 33
(Briefing Paper, July 18, 2007); Iraq: Fix the Public Distribution System to Meet Needs of
the Displaced, REFUGEES INT'L (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www.refugeesinternational.org/
content/article/detail/9971/; see also Robert Looney, Can Iraq Overcome the Oil Curse?,
7 WORLD EcoN. 21, 37 (2006).
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